NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 90 | Number 3

Article 5

3-1-2012

The Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Administration of Tax Expenditures
Jonathan P. Schneller

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jonathan P. Schneller, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Administration of Tax Expenditures, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 719 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol90/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF TAX EXPENDITURES*
JONATHAN P. SCHNELLER**

The field of tax expenditure analysis has generally assumed a
binary choice between tax expenditures and direct outlays.
Because tax expenditures have multiple traits that are said to
render them a suboptimal spending mechanism, scholars have
tended to argue that they should be eliminated outright, or that
they should be recast as direct expenditures. But despite such
arguments, tax expenditures have proven to be a resilient (and
politically popular) part of the American policy landscape, and
in recent decades they have expanded in both number and size.
This remarkable staying power suggests that tax expenditure
analysis may do well to shift its focus from outright elimination
to reforms that remedy or mitigate tax expenditures' more
problematic attributes.
This Article uses a case study of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) to explore one particularly promising target for such
reforms: the administration of tax expenditures. Scholars have
long contended that the EITC's high rate of noncompliance (i.e.,
payments made to ineligible taxpayers) shows that the tax system
is a flawed platform for the administrationof complex programs
with real-world goals unrelated to revenue collection. But such
critiques have generally assumed that, regardless of their policy
objectives, tax expenditures will be implemented with the same
administrative tools used for revenue collection. This Article
argues that tax expenditures need not rely on unmodified tax
administration,but rather that policymakers can address the tax
system's administrative limitations by implementing "hybrid"
administrative practices borrowed from nontax arenas. It
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illustrates this analyticalapproach by examining the adjudication
of EITC noncompliance in the United States Tax Court.
Currently, those suspected of EITC noncompliance are expected
to vindicate their claim for the credit via the same formal,
adversarial Tax Court procedures used to adjudicate claims of
tax underpayment. But as an analysis of EITC claims in Tax
Court reveals, such ordinary tax procedures are not well-suited
for the EITC context, which features low-income and usually
unrepresented taxpayers who are poorly positioned to vindicate
their claim in a formal, adversarialsetting. Policymakers should
thus consider deviating from traditionaltax administrationand,
in recognition of the EITC's welfare objectives, adopting the
collaborative, inquisitorial adjudicative approaches associated
with traditional welfare programs. Such hybrid practices would
better reflect the EITC's objectives and clientele, and could
significantly improve the fairness and efficiency of EITC
adjudication.
And what's true for EITC adjudication is true also for other
aspects of the EITC, as well as for tax expenditures more
generally. Where a tax expenditure has a real-world objective not
well-served by traditional tax administration, administrative
practices that are specifically tailored to reflect that objective will
improve policy outcomes. This Article thus concludes by
illustrating the broad potential of hybrid tax administration,
tentatively identifying a number of opportunities for the use of
hybrid administrativepractices to improve both the EITC and
other tax expenditures.
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INTRODUCTION

The field of tax expenditure analysis is based upon the premise
that certain provisions of the tax code effectively function not as
revenue collection tools, but as governmental spending programs. As
Justice Kagan recently explained in dissent in Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organization v. Winn,' preferential forms of tax
treatment such as tax credits and deductions may produce outcomes
identical to those of direct government spending programs:
Imagine that the Federal Government decides it should pay
hundreds of billions of dollars to insolvent banks in the midst of
a financial crisis. Suppose, too, that many millions of taxpayers
oppose this bailout on the ground (whether right or wrong is
immaterial) that it uses their hard-earned money to reward
irresponsible business behavior. In the face of this hostility,
some Members of Congress make the following proposal:
Rather than give the money to banks via appropriations, the
Government will allow banks to subtract the exact same
amount from the tax bill they would otherwise have to pay to
the U.S. Treasury. Would this proposal calm the furor? Or
would most taxpayers respond by saying that a subsidy is a
subsidy (or a bailout is a bailout), whether accomplished by the
1. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
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one means or by the other? Surely the latter; indeed, we would
think the less of our countrymen if they failed to see through
this cynical proposal.'
Professor Stanley Surrey was the first to note this functional
equivalency between certain tax provisions and direct governmental
spending;3 he coined the term "tax expenditures" to refer to such
provisions.' Tax expenditures, Surrey argued, suffered from
numerous defects as instruments of federal spending.5 For instance,
Surrey maintained that because tax expenditures are embodied in the
tax code, they are less transparent than direct expenditures, eluding
the scrutiny to which traditional appropriations are generally
subjected during the budget process.6 Likewise, he observed that tax
expenditures are regressive, providing the greatest financial benefit to
high-income individuals who face the highest marginal tax rates.7
Surrey additionally noted a further defect of tax expenditures,
one that is the focus of this Article. Tax expenditures are generally
not administered in any meaningful sense, but rather operate through
the mechanical processes of the tax system: tax returns are submitted,
checked for errors by the IRS, and tax payments or refunds are
delivered. While such basic tax administration fits the IRS's
traditional revenue collection mission well, it is completely insensitive
to policy context. The tax system's crude instruments are not adept at
measuring complex nonfinancial phenomena, such as nontraditional
family arrangements8 or environmental outcomes.9 Traditional tax
administration thus provides a glaringly poor administrative
foundation for programs under which hundreds of billions of dollars
are annually disbursed in pursuit of diverse policy objectives ranging
from antipoverty policy to environmental protection.
2. Id. at 1455-56 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
3. See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: Tax
Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1165 n.1 (1993) (describing
Professor Surrey's development of "the fundamental premises of tax expenditure analysis
...in the late 1960's" and citing key publications).
4. See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches
Necessary To Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct GovernmentalAssistance, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 352, 354 (1970).
5. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705,71932 (1970).
6. See, e.g., id. at 728-31.
7. Id. at 720-25. Surrey famously referred to such regressive tax expenditures as
"upside-down" subsidies. See id. at 722.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 59-65.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 360-64.
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Surrey concluded that the shortcomings of tax expendituresincluding their administrative defects 0 -warranted that most existing
tax expenditures be recast, and new spending programs structured, as
direct expenditures."1 Accordingly, while serving as the Johnson
Administration's Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy,
Surrey pioneered the field of tax expenditure analysis in the hope that
policymakers' use of tax expenditures would decrease once such
provisions were clearly identified as spending programs in the federal
budget. 12 Surrey's hopes were not realized. In fact, since he first
introduced the concept of "tax expenditures" to policy discussions in
the late 1960s, the use of tax expenditures to implement federal
spending programs has soared. In 1972, when Congress's Joint
Committee on Taxation first catalogued tax expenditures, the
Committee tabulated sixty tax expenditures in the federal budget.13
Its 2010 analysis counted some 240,14 and one recent study estimated
that in Fiscal Year 2011, the cost of tax expenditures was over one
trillion dollars-a figure approximately fifty percent higher than the
budget for non-defense discretionary spending. 5 Recently, the Joint
Committee on Taxation essentially announced defeat in its decadelong project to curb policymakers' reliance on tax expenditures,
stating in a 2008 report that the failure of tax expenditure analysis to
curb the growth of tax expenditures "does not mean ... that tax
expenditure analysis has failed, but rather that its principal utility
appears to have been as a tool of tax policy and tax distributional

10. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 2627 (1985) ("[I]f the task of administering 105 spending programs is then added to this
enormously difficult and complex task of normative income tax administration, the load
becomes too great.... The Commissioner of Internal Revenue cannot also serve as the
Secretary of Health and Human Services ...and as every other cabinet official and
properly perform either his or her prescribed role as Commissioner .....
11. See Surrey, supra note 4, at 361-62; Surrey, supra note 5, at 734.
12. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF
TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 2-3 (Comm. Print 2008), available at http://www.jct.gov/x37-08.pdf.
13. d. at 4.
14.

STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX

EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014, at 34-51 (Comm. Print 2010), availableat

http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3718.
15. LILY BATCHELDER & ERIC TODER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GOVERNMENT
SPENDING UNDERCOVER: SPENDING PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE IRS 1 (2010),

available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu-lewp/215/. Other estimates of the cost of tax
expenditures are even higher. See, e.g., Donald B. Marron, How Large Are Tax
Expenditures?, TAX NOTES, Mar. 28, 2011, at 1597, 1597 (estimating that tax expenditures
have an annual budget impact of $1.3 trillion).
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analysis."' 6 Expenditure control appears, at least for the moment, to
be a politically unrealistic goal for tax expenditure analysis.
Recognizing that tax expenditures, often supported by powerful
political constituencies,17 have exhibited remarkable staying power,
this Article seeks to inaugurate a new line of inquiry for tax
expenditure analysis-one that is focused on the reform, rather than
outright elimination, of tax expenditures. 8 Accordingly, whereas
Surrey and others regarded tax expenditures' administrative defects
as a justification for their elimination, this Article regards those same
defects as presenting an opportunity for administrative reform of tax
expenditures with the potential to significantly improve policy
outcomes. Specifically, it argues for experimentation with hybrid
administrative practices, by which traditional tax procedure is
selectively modified to promote tax expenditures' nonrevenuecollection policy objectives. Tax administration need not involve only
the mechanical sorting of tax returns. Rather, this Article argues that
where a tax provision serves policy objectives other than revenue
collection, the traditional hallmarks of tax administration can be
supplemented or modified to more efficiently, precisely, and fairly
advance those objectives.
16. STAFF OFJ. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., supra note 12, at 6; see also id.
(stating that tax expenditure analysis "in fact can provide a successful framework by which
to judge the fairness, efficiency and administrative consequences of many 'incentive'
proposals").
17. See, e.g., Daryl Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of
Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 687 (2011) ("The home mortgage
interest deduction, for example, creates a constituency of homeowners (joined by
mortgage lenders and other beneficiaries) that is deeply committed to, and formidably
capable of, preserving the entitlement.").
18. This Article's focus on reforming the administration of tax expenditures is not
intended to minimize the importance of scholarship and advocacy calling for the
elimination of tax expenditures. Even if such scholarship has not succeeded in slowing the
growth of tax expenditures, it has helped bring greater transparency to the federal budget
and acquainted policymakers with the tradeoffs and consequences of implementing
spending through the tax code. Furthermore, the insights of such scholarship could prove
invaluable if Congress were to act upon its occasional flirtation with comprehensive tax
reform. See, e.g., Bernie Becker, GOP: Push for Comprehensive Tax Reform, ON THE
MONEY: THE HILL'S FIN. & ECON. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2011, 12:49 AM), http://thehill.com
Iblogs/on-the-money/domestic-taxes/140273-gop-push-for-comprehensive-tax-reform.
However, this Article argues that because the elimination of tax expenditures appears
infeasible in light of political constraints, their administrative reform provides a feasible
"second-best" solution that is capable of improving upon current policy outcomes and
therefore warrants greater scholarly consideration. See generally R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (setting
forth economic theory of second best); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretationand Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 914-15 (2003) (applying second-best
theory to statutory interpretation).
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This Article explores this possibility through an in-depth case
study of the Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC"), a tax expenditure
that has become the nation's largest welfare program19 and has also
been the subject of extensive legal scholarship."0 The EITC is
administered via the tax system as a refundable tax credit.2 '
Applicants apply for the credit by submitting a tax return indicating
that they meet certain income and family criteria, and eligible
recipients receive a credit against their tax liability. If (as is often the
case) the size of the credit exceeds their tax liability, they receive a
refund check from the Treasury for the difference.23 The EITC is a
textbook tax expenditure. The government could employ a traditional
welfare bureaucracy to make eligibility determinations and distribute
funds to qualifying working families; instead, it conducts eligibility
screenings and disburses funds through the tax system, essentially to
the same effect.
The EITC provides a valuable case study in the potential benefits
of administrative reform because tax administration-which has
traditionally been geared toward collecting revenue from middle- and
upper-income individuals-is a particularly poor fit for the
administration of an antipoverty program that seeks to distribute
benefits to low-income workers.24 However, whereas critics of the
19. 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 78 (2009), availableat http:/Iwww.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl
/09_tasarc-vol-2.pdf (reporting that since the mid-1990s federal spending on the EITC
has significantly exceeded spending on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
("TANF"), the nation's largest traditional welfare program).
20. See generally Anne L. Alstott, The EarnedIncome Tax Creditand the Limitations
of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REv. 533 (1995) (examining the policy debate
regarding the EITC and identifying problems associated with using the tax system for
welfare purposes); Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 790 (2007) (analyzing EITC's viability in light of race-based welfare politics);
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the E1TC, 56 AM.
U. L. REV. 1261 (2007) (discussing design and policy goals of the EITC and making
recommendations for its improvement); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The
Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004) (analyzing
institutional design of EITC and concluding its tax-based administration "works
reasonably well"); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned
Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867 (2005) (examining EITC compliance trends
and defending the program's tax-based administration).
21. See Alstott, supra note 20, at 534 ("Although the EITC is styled a 'refundable tax
credit,' in fact it is a kind of welfare program-or, in economists' terms, an incometransfer program. It uses the rules and procedures of the federal income tax system to
make payments to low-income workers based on their earnings and total income.").
22. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 20, at 535; Leslie Book, The IRSs EITC Compliance
Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net, 81 OR. L. REV. 351,352 (2002).
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EITC's tax-based administration (perhaps following in Surrey's
footsteps) have traditionally argued for removing the program from
the tax system25 or otherwise overhauling it,26 this Article argues that
many of the program's deficiencies can be constructively addressed
through creative thinking about administration. The EITC is a
welfare program implemented through the tax code, and its
administration should be reconsidered to reflect its hybrid nature.
Where an inflexible reliance on traditional tax-collection practices
impedes the program's antipoverty mission, administrative reform
may provide superior outcomes without necessarily requiring that the
EITC abandon tax administration altogether.
This Article uses a case study of the EITC to illustrate a method
by which administrative and tax law scholars can analyze the
administration of tax expenditures more generally. The 240-odd
expenditures embedded in the Internal Revenue Code pursue a
diverse set of policy goals often unrelated to the tax code's traditional
emphasis on revenue collection.27 Where a tax expenditure pursues
such a nonrevenue policy goal, such as, for example, renewable
2
energy, 28 environmental protection,29
or education,30 the passive,
nondiscretionary nature of tax administration 31 will often produce
anomalous results at odds with an expenditure's underlying
objectives. For such expenditures, hybrid administrative practices that
modify tax procedure to reflect the expenditure's nontax policy goals
may substantially improve policy outcomes.
This Article does not presume to provide comprehensive
solutions for the EITC's ills. Rather, it seeks to open a neglected line
of inquiry with the potential to significantly improve the operation of
the EITC and other tax expenditures. More than forty years after
Stanley Surrey began his crusade against tax expenditures, it is clear
that tax expenditures are a near-permanent feature of the American

25. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 20, at 535 (arguing that the EITC's administrative
problems counsel for "greater tolerance of separate tax and transfer systems").
26. Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplification for Low-Income Taxpayers: Some
Options, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 177 (1996) (proposing replacing reliance on selfcertification with direct IRS tax preparation assistance for low-income taxpayers);
Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-Size
Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, 57 TAX L. REv. 301, 309-26 (2004) (arguing that the
EITC should be redesigned as a supplement to the minimum wage to reflect family size).
27. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., supra note 14, at 34-51.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 337-62.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 360-64.
30. See infra text accompanying note 316.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 319-35.
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policy and tax systems. The efforts of tax expenditure analysis should
reflect this reality.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I provides an account of
the policy dilemmas that have arisen as a result of the EITC's reliance
on tax administration. It highlights the EITC's problematic use of
"self-certification" by which applicants for the EITC certify their own
eligibility by submitting a tax return indicating that they satisfy the
program's various requirements. This tax-based eligibility mechanism
has predictably led to a high level of noncompliance and error in the
EITC. These problems, which have drawn extensive attention from
scholars and become focal points for the attacks of EITC critics,
demonstrate the difficulties inherent in efforts to administer an
antipoverty program through conventional tax channels.
Part II first describes and critiques scholars' uncritical acceptance
of unmodified tax procedure as the basis for administering the EITC.
It explains the false premises underlying the widespread scholarly
assumption-that if the EITC is to remain in the tax system it must be
administered using conventional tax procedure. It then argues that
nontax administrative practices can be applied to the administration
of tax expenditures to create "hybrid" administrative forms that
reflect a tax expenditure's nontax policy objectives, and thus result in
policy outcomes superior to those provided by pure tax
administration.
Part III provides a case study demonstrating how the EITC
stands to benefit from hybrid administrative practices. It analyzes in
detail one feature of tax administration that is decidedly ill-suited to
the EITC's antipoverty mission and where the potential benefits of
administrative hybridity are thus particularly striking: the use of
adversarial procedure in the U.S. Tax Court to adjudicate EITC
noncompliance cases. It finds that adversarial adjudication of
unrepresented, low-income litigants is likely to generate unfair and
inaccurate results. It accordingly proposes an alternative adjudicative
structure that deviates from traditional Tax Court practices, but
better suits the EITC's antipoverty mission.
Part IV tentatively identifies other opportunities to improve the
operation of tax expenditures through the use of hybrid
administrative practices. It first discusses two potential administrative
reforms to the EITC beyond those proposed in Part III. It then
addresses how recent controversies regarding an alternative energy
tax credit could have potentially been addressed using hybrid
administrative practices. The discussion in Part IV demonstrates that
hybrid administrative practices provide extensive opportunity for

728
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future scholarly inquiry with respect to both the EITC and other tax
expenditures.
I. THE EITC's UNEASY BALANCE
The Earned Income Tax Credit has long been an idiosyncratic
part of the American social policy landscape. At once a refundable
tax credit and a central pillar of American welfare policy,32 the
EITC's hybrid tax-transfer character defies straightforward
categorization and confounds efforts at critical evaluation.3 3 As a
refundable tax credit, the EITC is processed through the
administrative channels of the federal income tax system?4 Thus,
although an EITC claim is essentially a claim for welfare benefits, its
administrative treatment is in many respects indistinguishable from
that accorded to the tax return of a typical middle- or upper-income
taxpayer.35 A claim for EITC benefits begins with the submission of a
32. The legislative and political history of the EITC is beyond the scope of this
Article, and has been discussed extensively by others. See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.,
The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The PoliticalHistory of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, 1969-99, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 983 (2000) (discussing political origins and evolution of
the EITC). The EITC was not always viewed strictly as a welfare program. The program
has, at various points, alternatively been conceived of as a wage subsidy or an offset to
payroll taxes. See Alstott, supra note 20, at 534, 568. However, at least since the welfare
reform movement of the mid-1990s, the EITC has been routinely framed as a welfare
program in both scholarship, see, for example, Alstott, supra note 20, at 536 (analyzing the
EITC as a tax-based alternative to traditional welfare programs); Brown, supra note 20, at
793-95 (discussing implications of the "welfare" label for the EITC's political viability);
Ventry, supra note 20, at 1274 (discussing the EITC's role in 1990's welfare politics);
Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1873-74 (discussing the EITC as a welfare system administered
through the tax code), and in popular discourse, see, for example, President William J.
Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 126, 129 (Jan. 25, 1994), cited in Brown, supra note 20, at 793 (discussing EITC in
context of welfare reform debates). This characterization is contestable, but also widely
accepted and arguably justified by the program's obvious redistributive function.
33. See, e.g., Ventry, supra note 20, at 1263 ("Coordinating phase-outs, eliminating
marriage penalties, and deploying uniform refundable tax credits or universal tax
subsidies will not address a more fundamental conundrum that has plagued tax transfers
for over thirty years: What exactly are we trying to accomplish by delivering social
welfare benefits through the tax system?").
34. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1869 ("[T]he EITC can be viewed as a welfare
program that happens to be administered through the tax system.").
35. This is not to say that standard tax administration procedures are wholly
unmodified when applied to the EITC. There are a number of respects in which EITC
claims are subjected to differential treatment. Most notably, the IRS has experimented
with a variety of enforcement efforts aimed at combating what are perceived as
troublingly high rates of EITC noncompliance. The cumulative effect of such initiatives,
which are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 96-103, is a regime in which
EITC claims are significantly more likely to be audited than are conventional tax returns.
However, despite the fact that EITC claims may be subject to higher scrutiny than
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tax return reporting the claimant's annual income and family status
and specifying the size of the credit to which the claimant is entitled,36
a figure calculated on the basis of the claimant's income, marital
status, and number of qualifying children.3" As with typical income
tax submissions, the IRS subjects the vast majority of such claims only
to mechanical screening for mathematical or clerical errors, and in the
absence of such errors, it issues a refund check to the claimant.38
When the IRS suspects that an ineligible individual has erroneously
claimed a credit (a phenomenon known as noncompliance), its
investigations generally involve correspondence audits of the sort the
IRS employs in a wide array of minor investigations. 39 And, like other
taxpayers, claimants alleged to have erroneously claimed EITC
benefits are provided opportunities to vindicate their claims in the
U.S. Tax Court.'
The EITC's use of tax channels to pursue welfare objectives has
entailed some advantages over traditional welfare administration.
The lack of a cumbersome eligibility apparatus of the sort associated
with traditional welfare programs such as the Food Stamp program4 1
is commonly thought to both reduce the program's administrative
costs and increase participation rates among eligible individuals.42
Additionally, by employing tax-based administration, the EITC
avoids the fraught political connotations of traditional welfare

conventional tax returns, their administrative treatment is in key respects the same. EITC
claims are processed in the same institutional setting as are more conventional tax returns,
subject to near-identical administrative procedures.
36. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1876.
37. Although these are the key factors, the formula that determines the size of the
credit to which a claimant is entitled is in fact quite elaborate. See infra text accompanying
notes 59-61.
38. Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1876.
39. Id. at 1877; see also Fiscal Year 2006 Enforcement and Service Results: Statement of
IRS CommissionerMark W. Everson, IRS.Gov, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,,id
=164435,00.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2011) (noting the IRS's general reliance on
"correspondence, or letter exams").
40. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Comm'r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 660, 661-64 (2007), affd, 284 Fed.
App'x. 381, 382 (9th Cir. 2008).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
42. See Ventry, supra note 20, at 1264. While these putative benefits of selfcertification are widely repeated in scholarly literature, they are not incontestable. The
notion that self-certification involves administrative savings is particularly open to
question, given that, as discussed below, the EITC's complexity forces claimants to spend
significant sums each year on private tax preparation, see infra text accompanying notes
72-77, and that self-certification leads to billions of dollars of EITC payments being
diverted to ineligible recipients. See infra text accompanying notes 88-91.
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programs.43 But these advantages entail significant costs. Reliance on
tax-based administration has instilled an element of inflexibility into
EITC program design, constraining the range of options available to
institutional designers interested in refining the EITC to better serve
its antipoverty objectives. The tax system's administrative apparatus
evolved largely to determine and act upon the tax liability of middleincome, upper-income, and corporate taxpayers." Its processes for
both ex ante determination and ex post verification of tax liability are
thus tailored to the needs and capabilities of such taxpayers,
presuming a relatively sophisticated taxpayer with the resources to
navigate demanding administrative processes. This pedigree is an
awkward fit for the central task of EITC administration: to process,
evaluate, and act upon over twenty million benefits claims each
year. a5
One unique feature of the EITC inheres in the program's taxbased administrative form and distinguishes it from traditional
transfer programs: its reliance on applicant self-certification of
eligibility. Responsibility for determination of EITC eligibility rests
with the applicant, who, in submitting a tax return, is charged with
both certifying her own eligibility and determining the size of the
refund to which she is entitled. 46 The EITC's reliance on selfcertification poses a number of administrative dilemmas that have
been the source of considerable scholarly attention; most saliently,
that because of the EITC's complex eligibility criteria, the program's
reliance on self-certification predictably leads to a high rate of
noncompliance and error.4 7

43. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1903 ("The EITC is a transfer program with the
protective coloration of a tax program.").
44. See Book, supra note 24, at 352 ("IRS procedures seem based upon the traditional
notion [that] its constituents, namely middle- or upper-middle class taxpayers who
historically have been the individual targets of IRS compliance ... are ordinarily assumed
to be equipped to deal with IRS practices or able to hire professionals to do so for
them.").
45. See Sandy Gerber, Strengthening the Earned Income Tax Credit: Alternatives To
Refund Anticipation Loans, MINNEAPOLISFED.ORG (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www

.minneapolisfed.org/publications papers/pub display.cfm?id=4155 (reporting that almost
24 million claimants received EITC refunds in 2007).
46. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1869.
47. Id.; see also Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of
Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 1103, 1105-06

(linking a "crisis in administration" of the EITC to the lack of an "extensive bureaucracy
to predetermine eligibility"); Forman, supra note 26, at 177 (proposing replacing reliance
on self-certification with direct IRS tax preparation assistance for low-income taxpayers).
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This Article does not purport to detail a specific solution for the
policy dilemmas arising from the EITC's reliance on self-certification.
A detailed account of the problems arising from self-certification is
nonetheless valuable for two reasons. First, the hazards of selfcertification strikingly illustrate the difficulties inherent in using the
tax code to administer a welfare program and thus provide a valuable
starting point for discussion of EITC administration. Second, an
understanding of the burdens imposed by self-certification provides
essential context for the case study contained in Part III. That case
study questions whether it is fair to use adversarial trials to conduct ex
post adjudication of EITC claimants whom the IRS accuses of
erroneously claiming the credit. The unfairness of subjecting lowincome taxpayers to such adversarial adjudication cannot be fully
appreciated without an understanding of the conscious policy choice
to delegate ex ante eligibility assessment to EITC claimants, who are
generally not well-equipped to make such assessments.
A.

Self-Certification:Improvising an Eligibility Apparatus

Traditional welfare programs, such as the Food Stamp program,
require that a bureaucratic entity-most often, a field-level welfare
office 4 8 -precertify an applicant's eligibility prior to the disbursement
of any benefits.49 To gain precertification, applicants seeking benefits
under traditional welfare programs generally must visit a field office
during regular business hours (often multiple times), complete
detailed application forms, submit to in-person interviews with
welfare office personnel, and provide any supporting documentation
needed to verify eligibility.50 Applicants must be periodically
48. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a)(1) (2011) (prescribing Food Stamp program eligibility
verification processes for states and explaining that "State agencies must establish
procedures governing the operation of food stamp offices that the State agency determines
best serve households in the State").
49. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1878 ("In sharp contrast with the self-declared
eligibility norm for the EITC, self-declared eligibility is unheard of for transfer programs
such as TANF. Indeed, the requirement that an applicant establish eligibility to the
satisfaction of a government agency before receiving benefits is at the core of welfarebased administration."). This absolute requirement of an ex ante determination of
eligibility has been aptly described by Professor Zelenak as a "universal precertification"
requirement. See id. at 1916.
50. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d) (describing the eligibility process for the Food Stamp
program: "To determine eligibility, the application form must be completed and signed,
the household or its authorized representative must be interviewed, and certain
information on the application must be verified. If the household refuses to cooperate with
the State agency in completing this process, the application shall be denied at the time of
refusal"); Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 20, at 1000 (describing the application process
for the Food Stamp program).
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recertified for eligibility, a task usually involving return trips to
welfare field offices.s As a practical matter, this traditional mode of
welfare administration is labor-intensive, relying on dispersed cadres
of "street-level" intake workers both for initial determinations of
eligibility and for periodic recertifications.
The EITC presents a stark contrast to this traditional approach.
The program lacks a bureaucratic eligibility apparatus, instead
employing applicant self-certification via the tax return as the
predicate for receipt of benefits. Applicants declare their eligibility by
submitting a tax return specifying the size of the credit to which they
are entitled, and the vast majority of such returns are subjected only
to routine, mechanical scrutiny for mathematical or clerical error.53

A formal assessment from an institutional design perspective
would suggest that the EITC replaces an extensive eligibility

bureaucracy consisting of state offices, caseworkers, and annual
recertification with a handful of entries on a tax return indicating that
an applicant meets EITC eligibility criteria and is entitled to a

reduced tax burden or a refund. The EITC has thus been lauded for
its simplicity vis-A-vis the elaborate infrastructure associated with
traditional transfer programs. Scholars have noted the administrative
convenience that comes with the EITC's decision to piggy-back on
existing systems of tax administration54 and have linked the program's
administrative minimalism to its high participation rates and the
reduced stigma facing EITC applicants.55
51. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 20, at 1000-01.
52. See Alstott, supra note 20, at 564-65 ("Welfare administration is labor-intensive,
expensive, and heavily dependent on 'street-level' bureaucrats, who may administer
programs in a manner at odds with their formal terms.").
53. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1876. Internal Revenue Code section 6213(g)
provides the IRS with "math error authority" to withhold refund checks when, due to
mathematical or clerical error, a tax return overstates the size of a refund to which a
taxpayer is entitled. I.R.C. § 6213(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). Section 6213(b)(1)
identifies a number of clerical errors unique to the EITC, and in 2002 math error notices
led to the delay of 1.1 million EITC claims out of the 19 million claims filed that year.
I.R.C. § 6213(g) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1876.
54. See, e.g., Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 20, at 981-82 ("[I]f one considers
government policy as a whole, integration [of welfare programs] with the tax system may
often be a choice for simplicity. Integration is a choice to take advantage of the
infrastructure of the tax system at the cost of less accuracy in program design than would
be achieved through a separate agency.").
55. Alstott, supra note 20, at 534 ("[A]dvocates argue, because the EITC is part of the
federal tax system, it is simpler and cheaper to administer than programs run by the
welfare bureaucracy and affords greater dignity and privacy to beneficiaries."); see also
Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Incentives and
Income Distribution,12 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 83, 109-10 (1998) ("The higher take-up rates
for the EITC may be because there is no stigma to claiming the EITC and because of the

2012]

EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT

However, the EITC's reality belies its ostensible minimalism.
The EITC has not eliminated the administrative burdens associated
with traditional welfare programs so much as it has outsourced them,
both to the taxpayers charged with self-certification and to the private
tax preparers to whom such taxpayers often turn. This schema has
predictably led to troubling levels of noncompliance: EITC claimants
have had difficulty navigating the credit's complex rule structure
while private preparers face financial incentives to turn a blind eye to
(or even encourage) ineligible taxpayers applying for the credit.
Three specific features of EITC administration interact to
undermine the program's promise of simplicity, instead creating a
shadow bureaucracy that fuels noncompliance. The first of these is
self-certification itself. In order to claim the EITC, low-income
taxpayers with no tax liability are required to file income tax returns
certifying their eligibility and specifying the size of the credit to which
they are entitled. 6 This requirement imposes a significant burden
upon EITC claimants, many of whom would not be required to file
tax returns in the absence of their EITC claim, and who may lack the
sophistication of more well-off taxpayers.57 This arrangement creates
opportunities for claimants to file erroneous returns, whether due to
simple mistake or deliberate fraud.58
Second, EITC eligibility is determined by a complex rule
structure that does not lend itself to decentralized self-certification by
low-income workers. A 1997 statement of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants describes the credit's eligibility criteria
as a "nightmare of eligibility tests, requiring a maze of worksheets."59
low costs of claiming the credit (most EITC recipients would have filed a tax return in the
absence of the EITC)."); John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation,
Compliance, and Antipoverty Effectiveness, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 63, 71 (1994) ("There is little

or no stigma associated with the EITC, while stigma associated with transfer programs
such as AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] and Food Stamps may
discourage participation in those programs." (citing Robert Moffitt, An Economic Model
of Welfare Stigma, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 1023, 1033-34 (1983))).

56. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1868 (discussing the EITC's reliance on selfdeclared eligibility).
57. See, e.g., Book, supra note 24, at 396-405 (discussing EITC claimants' literacy

issues, language barriers, fear of government, inability to understand the EITC, and
distrust of financial institutions).
58. See Jonathan Barry Forman, How To Reduce the Compliance Burden of the
Earned Income Tax Credit on Low-Income Workers and the Internal Revenue Service, 48
OKLA. L. REV. 63,64 (1995).
59. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, Tax Simplification Recommendations,
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, May 16, 1997,
3, available at LEXIS 97 TNI 95-21. The

criteria for EITC eligibility have been modified since the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants ("AICPA") made its 1997 statement. For example, the definition of a

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

The statement noted that the application for the credit requires a
claimant to consider:
nine eligibility requirements; the number of qualifying
children-taking into account relationship, residency and age
tests; the taxpayer's earned income-taxable and nontaxable;

the taxpayer's adjusted gross income (AGI); the taxpayer's
modified AGI; threshold amounts; phase out rates; and varying
credit rates.60

The statement concludes that "it is unreasonable to expect those
individuals entitled to the credit (who will almost certainly NOT be
expert in tax matters) to deal with this complexity. Even our
members, who tend to calculate the credit for taxpayers as part of
their volunteer work, find this area to be extremely challenging."61
The complexity of this maze-like rule structure is compounded

by the EITC's effort to impose formal definitions of family structure
upon the fluid and unconventional family arrangements often

confronting EITC claimants. Crucial to a claimant's eligibility is the
presence of a "qualifying child" in the claimant's household;62 to
qualify, a child must reside in the taxpayer's place of abode for more
than half of the tax year, must be the taxpayer's child or sibling

(including stepchild and stepsibling), a descendant of the taxpayer's
child or sibling, or a foster child, and, unless a full-time student, must
not have reached the age of nineteen. 63 These bright-line criteria
generate significant ambiguity when applied to unconventional
custodial arrangements, such as households featuring extended

"qualifying child" was modified to provide a uniform definition of "qualifying child" for
the EITC, the child care tax credit, and the child and dependent care credit. See Working
Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §§ 201, 206, 118 Stat. 1166, 1169-75,
1176 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 151(c), 152 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). However,
despite such modifications, the fundamental structure and design of the EITC's eligibility
rules is essentially unchanged since that time, and the complexity of which the AICPA
complained remains a defining feature of the credit. See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting
the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 263 (2011) ("The earned
income tax ...has very complex definitional rules and requires complex calculations
60. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, supra note 59, 3.
61. Id. 1 9.
62. The EITC is primarily a credit for low-income workers with children.
Childless taxpayers are eligible for a relatively miniscule EITC benefit. See
I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (providing eligible individuals with no
qualifying children a credit equivalent to 7.65% of earned income, as compared to a credit
of 34% for eligible individuals with one qualifying child and 40% for eligible individuals
with two qualifying children).
63. § 32(c)(3)(A); I.R.C. § 152(c).
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families under the care of one or more providers. 64 Likewise, because
the EITC requires that married claimants file joint tax returns unless
they are separated for more than half the year, it may be difficult for
estranged couples with unconventional custody arrangements to meet
EITC qualifying criteria.65 Section III.B discusses individual cases in
which these rules generate harsh results for arguably deserving
taxpayers with unconventional family arrangements. However, for
the purposes of the present discussion it is sufficient to note that the
complexity of the EITC's elaborate set of bright-line rules is
exacerbated by the fact that those rules do not neatly map onto the
realities confronting many low-income workers, and that this
complexity is almost certain to lead to error and noncompliance.
Third, a majority of low-income workers are driven by the
EITC's complexity to turn for help, often at considerable expense, to
private tax preparers with perverse incentives.66 Recent studies have
estimated that as many as seventy-three percent of taxpayers claiming
the EITC hire private tax preparation services to assist them in
preparing and filing their returns.67 Such services are often
accompanied by Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs), high-interest
loans made in anticipation of the EITC benefit. 8 While the existing
empirical studies of paid EITC preparation are dated, they indicate
that a significant proportion of EITC funds is diverted each year to
private tax preparers. In 1999, for example, an estimated $1.75 billion
in EITC funds was siphoned toward private tax preparers for services

64. See, e.g., Perez v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 1004, 1006 (1998) (ruling that EITC

claimant who resided with an extended family network could not claim his nephew,
Tirone, as a qualifying child because "there is not sufficient evidence in this record
indicating that petitioner cared for Tirone as his own child. There were other members of
petitioner's household, including Tirone's mother, who were available to care for the
child").
65. See Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in
THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 148, 155 (Henry Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004);
see also Diaz v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1420, 1421 (2004) (deeming claimant ineligible
for EITC for failure to conclusively demonstrate that he and his wife separated in June,

rather than July, of the relevant tax year).
66. See generally Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Payingfor Government
Benefits: Fixing the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 WiS. L. REV. 461 (explaining how

complex tax laws, including the rules surrounding the EITC benefit, cause an increased
demand for professional tax preparation services among low-income workers).
67. 1 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
423 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08-tas-arc-legrec.pdf (discussing
rates of paid preparer use by 2006 EITC filers).
68. See Lipman, supra note 66, at 472.
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such as tax preparation, electronic filing, and refund loans.69 A 2002
Brookings Institution study found that in Washington, D.C.,
taxpayers claiming an EITC of $1,500 spent, on average, more than
ten percent of their benefit on tax preparation services.7" Such figures
are striking: EITC recipients by definition live near or below the
poverty line, and tax preparation is relatively costly. That EITC
claimants would devote such a significant proportion of their credit to
tax preparation services suggests that self-certification, far from
serving as a simplifying device that expands EITC availability, may
well present a barrier rendering many low-income workers incapable
of claiming the benefit without expensive assistance. 7
For two reasons, the emergence of the EITC paid-preparer
industry weakens claims that self-certification yields meaningful
administrative efficiencies by avoiding the expenses associated with
an eligibility bureaucracy of the sort common to traditional welfare
programs. First, paid tax preparation services constitute a hidden
expense of EITC administration, an expense that has simply been
shifted from the program to EITC claimants.72 Private-sector tax
preparers have come to serve as a de facto front-end eligibility
apparatus, conduits through which a significant number of claimants
must pass to receive EITC funds. The $1.75 billion in EITC payments
that were diverted toward private-sector tax preparers in 1999
constitute expenditures diverted from the program's intended
recipients, and as such are appropriately viewed as costs of
administration.7 3 This diversion amounts to approximately 5.6% of
the $31.3 billion of EITC funds disbursed that year.74 While this figure
69. ALAN BERUBE ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE PRICE OF PAYING TAXES: How
TAX PREPARATION AND REFUND LOAN FEES ERODE THE BENEFITS OF THE EITC 1

(2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/berubekimeitc.pdf.
70. Id.
71. It should be noted that the available studies examining EITC claimants' use of
paid preparers all date to the beginning of this decade, and thus predate the recent
explosion in online'filing. The impact of web-based filing upon EITC recipients presents a
potentially valuable opportunity for empirical inquiry. This Article presumes that the
trends identified by these studies continue to hold, due both to lack of evidence to the
contrary and to the fact that the most prominent online preparation services are fee based.
72. See Alstott, supra note 20, at 590 ("The cost of return preparation ... is properly
viewed as a hidden administrative cost of the EITC program."); David A. Super,
Privatization,Policy Paralysis,and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393,433-34 (2008) ("The
costs of administering public benefit programs inevitably are divided between claimants
and the government.... For example, EITC claimants bear virtually all the costs of
applying.").
73. See Super, supra note 72, at 435-37.
74. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 1999 RETURNS 3 (2002), availableat http://www.irs
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is smaller than the administrative costs of comparable transfer
programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (10%) 7"
and the Food Stamp program (25%),76 it is nonetheless a significant
hidden programmatic expense that casts doubt upon self77
certification's cost-effectiveness.
The second reason why pervasive paid EITC preparation
undermines claims regarding the administrative efficiency of selfcertification is that private-sector tax preparers are distinct from
traditional welfare eligibility bureaucracies in a key respect: the
accuracy of their results. Whereas the organizing principle of
traditional welfare bureaucracies is the need to efficiently render an
accurate determination of eligibility,78 private-sector tax preparers are
motivated by the need to collect fees from clients. Paid preparers
have economic incentives to file EITC claims on behalf of ineligible
claimants because a significant portion of their revenue is derived
from services-such as refund anticipation loans and check-cashing
fees-purchased via EITC payments. 79 Erroneous EITC claims filed
by paid preparers, a phenomenon Professor Leslie Book has dubbed
"brokered noncompliance," account for a significant proportion of
noncompliant EITC claims: fifty-seven percent of EITC overclaims in
1999 were the product of tax returns filed by paid preparers. 81 The
emergence of the paid EITC preparation industry has thus helped
contribute to a noncompliance epidemic that is estimated to divert
approximately thirty percent of EITC payments to ineligible
recipients.' Like EITC funds diverted to paid preparers, this
noncompliance-amounting annually to billions of dollars of
.gov/pub/irs-utl/1999_compliancestudy_022802.pdf.
75. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1881-82.
76. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 20, at 1011-12.
77. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1881.
78. See, e.g., JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 34-35 (1983) (describing the
"bureaucratic rationality model" underlying administration of Social Security Disability
Insurance).
79. See Danshera Cords, Paid Tax Preparers,Used Car Dealers, Refund Anticipation
Loans, and the Earned Income Tax Credit: The Need To Regulate Tax Return Preparers
and Provide More Free Alternatives, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 351, 353-54 (2009). In
addition to these perverse incentives to generate erroneous EITC claims, there is also
evidence that many paid preparers may prepare erroneous claims out of simple
incompetence. See Book, supra note 47, at 1146.
80. Book, supra note 47, at 1114-17; see also Cords, supra note 79, at 368 (discussing
Professor Book's "brokered noncompliance" observation).
81. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

270 (2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta_2003_annual-updatemcw_1-15042.pdf.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 88-91.
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misdirected payments-must 3be regarded as a hidden and significant
cost of EITC administration.
In response to these trends, the IRS has recently expanded
scrutiny of paid preparers through an EITC Due Diligence
Compliance Program that promises to increase audits of paid
preparers and impose civil penalties upon preparers who fail to
comply with IRS due diligence standards.' This is not the first time
the IRS has undertaken such efforts, and enforcement of paid
preparer standards has, in the past, been anemic."s It remains to be
seen whether this initiative is a token gesture or bona fide
intensification of oversight. However, the threatened fines-ranging
from $100 for failure to meet due diligence standards on a given
EITC return to $5,000 for intentional or reckless understatement of
tax liability 86-are small in relation to the profits generated by private
EITC claim preparation,8 7 and, absent broad enforcement, they seem
unlikely to significantly impact the incentives confronting private tax
preparers.
Thus, far from creating a simple eligibility mechanism that avoids
the extensive bureaucracy associated with traditional transfer
programs, the EITC places the burden of complex eligibility
determinations upon low-income taxpayers. This institutional design
choice creates a high level of inaccurate claims, and the dynamic is
exacerbated by the emergence of private tax preparers with incentives
inapposite to their delegated role as benefit gatekeepers. The ongoing
controversy over EITC noncompliance (discussed in the following
Section) must therefore be understood as a direct consequence of an
institutional design that relinquished governmental responsibility for
ex ante eligibility determinations.

83. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1915 ("[I1f total administrative costs of a transfer
program are defined as direct administrative costs plus overpayments of benefits, then the
costs of tax-based administration of the EITC and welfare-based administration of Food
Stamps are very similar (adjusted for program size). The difference, however, is that most
of the Food Stamp costs are direct costs of administration, whereas most of the EITC costs
are overpayments.").
84. EITC PreparerCompliance-Targeted,Tailoredand Tiered, IRS.GOV, http://www
.eitc.irs.gov/rptoolkit/compliance/ (last updated Oct. 12, 2011).
85. See, e.g., NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 81, at 270 (reporting
that "for the period from FY 2001 to FY 2003, the IRS has assessed only 163 EITC due
diligence penalties, amounting to $666,250, and has collected only $233,724 of those
penalties").
86. See EITC PreparerCompliance-Targeted,Tailoredand Tiered, supra note 84.
87. See, e.g., BERUBE ET AL., supra note 69, at 1 (estimating that $1.75 billion in EITC
refunds were diverted toward paid preparers in 1999).
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The EITC's Noncompliance Problem

The above-described eligibility apparatus, featuring complex
eligibility criteria and relying on low-income workers and paid
preparers to certify EITC eligibility, has predictably led to a
significant rate of noncompliance among EITC applicants. The IRS
estimates that for Tax Year (TY) 2004, between $9.6 billion and $11.4
billion in erroneous EITC payments were made, approximately a
quarter of the $41.3 billion in EITC claims paid for that year. 8 A 2002
study of EITC payments in TY 1999 found similarly high rates of
noncompliance, estimating that the IRS made between $8.5 billion
and $9.9 billion in erroneous payments (between 27% and 32% of
that year's total EITC payments).8 9 The prevalence of such errors
should come as no surprise. In light of the unique challenges faced by
low-income workers, a system that relies on them to carry out
challenging eligibility determinations will inevitably produce error in
abundance.
That a significant proportion of the EITC's annual budget
appears to be diverted to ineligible claimants raises serious concerns
about the program's efficiency: such expenditures must be paid for
through either higher tax rates or reduced expenditures on deserving
claimants.9" And such efficiency concerns necessarily entail serious
equity concerns as well. As Janet McCubbin notes:
When noncompliance is undetected, noncompliant taxpayers
are better off than compliant taxpayers with the same income
and family characteristics, violating horizontal equity. In
addition, to the extent that cheating reduces the targeting of the
EITC, it might reduce the progressivity of the tax system and
reduce the value of the EITC to policymakers and taxpayers. 91
Not surprisingly, the EITC's noncompliance rates have long
attracted negative attention. In 1995, after an IRS report documented
significant EITC noncompliance, the United States Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs held hearings on the future of
88. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE EARNED INCOME TAX
TO
ALTERNATIVES
ADVANCES; HOWEVER,
CREDIT PROGRAM
HAS MADE
TRADITIONAL COMPLIANCE METHODS ARE NEEDED To STOP BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
IN ERRONEOUS PAYMENTS 1 (2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta

/auditreports/2009reports/200940024fr.pdf.
89. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 74, at 3.
90. Janet McCubbin, Noncompliance with the Earned Income Tax Credit: The
Determinants of the Misreporting of Children, in MAKING WORK PAY 237, 237 (Bruce
Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., 2002).

91. Id. at 238.
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the EITC to "determine the extent of fraud, waste, and abuse"
associated with the program.' The hearings culminated in the
introduction of ultimately unsuccessful legislation to reduce the size
of the EITC and enhance antifraud efforts. 3 The tone of a 1997
House Ways and Means Committee hearing on the topic of EITC
compliance9 4 was sufficiently heated to lead Professor Lawrence
Zelenak to worry that "influential members of Congress could
respond to high levels of EITC noncompliance by replacing tax-based
administration with welfare-based administration, or by repealing the
program in its entirety."9 5
Whether or not the IRS shared Professor Zelenak's perception
that noncompliance issues posed an existential threat to the EITC, it
responded to this political scrutiny by escalating enforcement
initiatives targeting EITC claimants. In 2003, the IRS announced an
experimental precertification initiative, requiring 45,000 expected
EITC claimants "to provide more information on their relationship to
and/or residency status of the qualifying children listed on their [2002]
return."96 The IRS announced an intention to expand the
precertification program to cover as many as two million EITC
claimants by the following year. 7 A firestorm of negative publicity
protested the heightened burden placed upon low-income taxpayers,
and the IRS retreated.9" Meanwhile, less visible enforcement efforts
flourished. Following the mid-1990s noncompliance firestorm, the
proportion of IRS audits targeting EITC claimants increased
dramatically.9 9 By 2004, an EITC household was 1.76 times more
likely to be audited than a household with an annual salary over
$100,000, and in 2005 a full forty-three percent of IRS audits of
92. See Administration of the Earned Income Tax Creditand Design and Effectiveness
of the Earned Income Tax Credit: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
104th Cong. 3 (1995) (statement of Sen. William V. Roth, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs).
93. Roth Bill, S. 899, 104th Cong. (1995).
94. Internal Revenue Service's 1995 Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance Study:
HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 63, 67 (1997).
95. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1916 n.200 (discussing 1995 House hearings).
96. INTERNAL

INITIATIVE

REVENUE

SERV.,

IRS

EXPLANATION OF

EITC VERIFICATION

5 (2003), cited in Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1869, available at LEXIS, Tax

Analysts, Tax Notes Today, 2003 TNT 71-91.
97. Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1870.
98. See, e.g., Editorial, The I.R.S. Goes After the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, at
12 ("If the I.R.S. wants to harass the poor, and undermine a key incentive for taking lowwage jobs, it should keep doing what it is doing. But if it is interested in increasing tax
compliance, and bringing in more lost tax dollars, it should start focusing its enforcement
efforts higher up the income scale.").
99. See, e.g., Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 65, at 159.
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individual taxpayers involved an EITC claim. I"° These audits
employed aggressive tactics and often led to wrongful determinations
of noncompliance. The National Taxpayer Advocate's 2004 report to
Congress found that IRS EITC audits were "characterized by
confusing correspondence; unnecessary, inconsistent and burdensome
documentation requests; and lengthy audit cycles."1 1 The report
found that 43% of taxpayers who sought reconsideration of
unfavorable audits received additional EITC credit beyond that for
which the audit had found them eligible; on average, such taxpayers
received 94% of the sum claimed on their original tax return.0 2 Thus,
the report concluded, EITC "audit results did not accurately reflect [a
taxpayer's] eligibility for the EITC. Rather, the audits merely show
that the taxpayer flunked the IRS audit process."1 3
The political scrutiny that the EITC's noncompliance problem
has engendered appears to presuppose that the EITC's
noncompliance problem can, as then-Senator Roth suggested, be
attributed to "fraud, waste, and abuse."" However, there is reason to
believe that a significant proportion of EITC noncompliance is
attributable not to deliberate taxpayer fraud, but rather to
unintentional error arising from the limitations of the tax-based
eligibility apparatus described in the previous Section. Despite the
extensive scholarly and political scrutiny of EITC noncompliance,
there is surprisingly little data as to how the estimated levels of EITC
noncompliance break down between intentional and unintentional
noncompliance. 15 There is, however, evidence that a substantial

100. Stephen D. Holt, Keeping It in Context: Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance
and Treatment of the Working Poor, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 183, 190-91 (2007); see also

Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 65, at 159 ("[Wlhile audit rates have generally fallen,
the odds of being audited have increased for low-income filers relative to other filers. In
1988 the audit rate among 1040A nonbusiness filers with positive income below $25,000
was 1.03 percent, while the average audit rate among all filers was 1.57 percent. By 2000

the audit rate was 0.49 percent for all taxpayers, but it was 0.6 percent among 1040A
nonbusiness filers with income under $25,000 and 1.4 percent among EITC claimants."
(footnote omitted)).
101. 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC) AUDIT RECONSIDERATION STUDY i (2004),
available at http:/lwww.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta2004arcvol2interactive.pdf.
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
105. See Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 65, at 169; see also Leslie Book, EITC
Noncompliance: What We Don't Know Can Hurt Them, TAX NOTES, June 23, 2003, at
1821, 1824 ("Even though the IRS has studied and reported on EITC noncompliance in

three separate studies in the past decade, there is very little data relating to how much
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amount of noncompliance results from inadvertent errors made when
low-income workers attempt to navigate the EITC's labyrinthine
structure. A 2000 study of EITC noncompliance found that the
incidence of qualifying child errors on TY 1994 EITC claims was
"correlated with lower levels of education, income, and wealth,
perhaps because less-educated taxpayers are more likely to make
unintentional errors." ' 6 Tellingly, in TY 1999 about $2.1 billion in
EITC overclaims (almost one-fifth of total overclaims) were
attributable to a taxpayer's employing a filing status of "married filing
separately," which renders a claimant automatically ineligible for the
EITC. 1°7 That a large number of EITC claimants select an instantly
disqualifying filing status on their returns indicates that taxpayer
confusion is responsible for a nontrivial proportion of EITC
noncompliance.
In sum, the EITC's use of unmodified tax administration is a
two-edged sword. Tax administration is often touted as a major
strength of the EITC. It is said to lower administrative costs, raise
participation rates, and help the program avoid the politically toxic
associations of traditional welfare. 8 However, certain aspects of
unmodified tax administration generate serious waste, raise
significant normative concerns, and subject the program to political
attack. The question, then, is whether there is any way for the EITC
to retain the beneficial aspects of tax administration while
ameliorating the problems associated with it.
II. A HYBRID APPROACH TO THE EITC

The account provided in Part I is consistent with the observations
of other scholars who have long recognized the deep-seated
pathologies afflicting the EITC, and further recognized that those
pathologies are the direct byproduct of the program's reliance on tax
administration.0 9 However, such scholars have failed to explore a
EITC noncompliance relates to intentional conduct and how much relates to unintentional
error.").
106. Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 65, at 170.
107. Id. at 167-68.
108. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 20, at 794 (discussing the politically charged overtones
of the word "welfare"); Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 20, at 1004 (discussing the lower
administrative costs and greater participation rates in the EITC, as compared to Food
Stamps).
109. This line of scholarship dates at least to 1995, when Anne Alstott argued that "the
tax system's limitations render the EITC inherently inaccurate, unresponsive, and
vulnerable to fraud and error in ways that traditional welfare programs are not." Alstott,
supra note 20, at 535; see also, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1873 ("The controversy over
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seemingly obvious corollary of their insights: that administrative
innovations that retain the core features of tax administration but
flexibly deviate from it to reflect the EITC's antipoverty mission can
yield significant improvements in the program's fairness and
efficiency. This notion is highly intuitive. There is no logical reason to
expect that an elaborate system that evolved to process middle- and
upper-income tax returns could be shoehorned, unmodified, into an
antipoverty redistributive setting without significant difficulty. One
might therefore expect that both scholars and policymakers would
contemplate administrative reforms tailored to reflect the EITC's
unique status as a hybrid creature of tax and welfare policy. However,
openness to such reform is, to a surprising extent, absent in both
theory and practice. Rather, the dominant scholarly approach has
adopted a binary view of the EITC's administration, based upon the
assumption that policymakers implementing welfare programs face a
constrained choice between pure tax administration and traditional
welfare administration. 110
This Part argues that this strict dichotomy between pure tax
administration and pure welfare administration is misguided. The
Part proceeds in two Sections. The first Section critiques the
pervasive assumption that if the EITC is to be administered through
the tax system, it must rely on unmodified tax administration. The
second Section sets forth an alternative approach based upon
administrative reforms that deviate from pure tax administration as
necessary to enhance the EITC's efficiency and fairness.
A.

The DominantBinary Conception of the EITC

Though the scope of Anne Alstott's comprehensive 1995
Harvard Law Review article11 1 reached far beyond the subject of
administration, Alstott's comments on EITC administration
foreshadowed subsequent scholarly treatment of the subject. Alstott
identified profound dilemmas arising from the EITC's reliance on tax
administration. 1 2 Having done so, Alstott suggested that those
dilemmas counseled for "greater tolerance of separate tax and

EITC precertification-and over the appropriate level of EITC compliance and
enforcement efforts more generally-is a consequence of the EITC's status as a hybrid
tax-transfer program.").
110. For the most straightforward and explicit example of this binary view, see
Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 20, at 961.
111. Alstott, supra note 20.
112. Id. at 566-89 (discussing the tax system's difficulties with accurate measurement of
need, responsiveness, and compliance).
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transfer systems,""' 3 elaborating that "improving the performance of
the EITC or other tax-based transfer programs requires either
compromising the benefits of tax-based administration or
undertaking a major restructuring of basic institutions of the federal
tax system.""' 4 This conception of EITC administration as posing a
binary choice between tax administration and traditional welfare
administration subsequently came to dominate EITC scholarship." 5
As a result of this binary conception, even the most ambitious
proponents of EITC reform have not advocated for serious
administrative modifications of the program. Instead, reformers have
argued for restructuring the benefit within the tax system, ll6 for
removing the program from the tax system entirely,'17 or for
palliatives such as subsidized professional representation to help lowmore effectively navigate standard IRS
income taxpayers
118
procedures.
There are three possible explanations for the current unspoken
consensus that the EITC's tax-based administration implicates a
binary choice between tax and welfare administration. First, the
binary conception of the EITC can be understood as an intellectual
legacy of tax expenditure analysis, which advocated for the outright
elimination, rather than the administrative reform, of inefficient tax
expenditures." 9 Second, the current approach may reflect the desire
of EITC proponents to avoid the politically problematic "taint of
welfare" by maintaining a minimal (and minimally visible)
administrative apparatus. Third, the current approach can be
attributed to the notion that administrative reform risks
compromising crucial institutional design benefits that derive from
113. Id. at 535.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 20, at 961 (explaining that government
programs can be implemented either through direct spending or tax programs); Zelenak,
supra note 20, at 1915 (addressing whether the EITC is better administered as a tax or
welfare program).
116. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 129-30 (2006)
(proposing replacement of the EITC with a Social Security tax exemption and a
refundable child tax credit); Annette Nellen, Simplification of the EITC Through
Structural Changes, in 3 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE
OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION 205, 205-19 (Comm. Print 2001), availableat http://www.house.gov/jct/s-

3-01vol3.pdf (proposing replacing EITC with offset on payroll taxes).
117. See Alstott, supranote 20, at 535.
118. See, e.g., Book, supra note 24, at 411-26 (arguing for greater assistance to lowincome taxpayers, including subsidized counsel and expansion of low-income tax clinics).
119. See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., supra note 12, at 6
(discussing tax expenditure analysis's "mission of 'expenditure control' ").

2012]

EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT

the EITC's reliance on pure tax administration. Upon closer
examination, none of these three explanations provides a compelling
basis for EITC scholarship's rigid binary conception of the program's
administration.
1. The Legacy of Tax Expenditure Analysis
In a seminal 1970 article, Stanley Surrey stated that the central
questions of tax expenditure analysis included "which tax
expenditures ...can simply be dropped without substituting another
form of governmental assistance," which tax expenditures "cannot
simply be dropped ... but can be readily changed from tax
expenditures to direct expenditures," and which tax expenditures
"function more efficiently and effectively as tax expenditure
programs than as direct expenditures? '"120 Tax expenditure analysis,
as a discipline, was conceived with the goal of reducing or eliminating
tax expenditures, rather than reforming or perfecting them, and its
fundamental object of inquiry was not whether tax expenditures
could be improved, but whether they could be replaced with direct
expenditures. 121 Its practitioners, following Surrey, framed tax
expenditures and direct outlay programs as "alternative means of
accomplishing similar budget policy objectives,"1 22 and focused on the
question of whether the tax system is preferable to a direct outlay as a
123
format for implementing a particular program.
Consistent with this analytical method, in a 2004 article in the
Yale Law Journal,David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim framed welfare
administration in general as presenting institutional designers with a
binary choice between tax administration and welfare administration:
"[A]ny program can be implemented in at least two ways. It can be
implemented through a direct spending program or a tax program.
The question is how to make this choice. '24 Largely because the

120. Surrey, supra note 4, at 361-62.
121. See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., supra note 12, at 2

("[Tax expenditure pioneer Stanley] Surrey believed that a close analysis of tax
expenditures could lead to better 'expenditure control' by the Congress, through a more
complete accounting for government expenditures regardless of their form.").
122. STAFF OFJ. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007-2011, at 2 (Comm. Print 2007), available at

http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1198.
123.

See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF

TAX EXPENDITURES 1-6 (1973); Surrey, supra note 4, at 359; see also BATCHELDER &

supra note 15, at 1-2 (discussing drawbacks of tax expenditures as compared to
direct expenditures).
124. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 20, at 961.
TODER,
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EITC's status as a wage supplement makes responsiveness to shortterm income fluctuations a less pressing concern than in welfare
programs such as Food Stamps, Weisbach and Nussim conclude that
the program is properly administered as a tax, rather than direct
spending, program. 125 The notion that a welfare program's
administrative form could include features of both tax and traditional
welfare administration is wholly absent from Weisbach and Nussim's
analysis. Weisbach and Nussim's analytical method can be traced
directly to the tax expenditure analysis project, which regards all
programs as capable of being administered as either tax expenditures
or direct expenditures and simply asks which method is more
appropriate for a particular program.
In short, in tax expenditure analysis, "direct spending" and "tax
administration" represent distinct concepts that are defined in strict
opposition to one another. As a consequence of this binary analytical
framework, administrative reform of tax expenditures has not
emerged as a particularly prominent concern of tax expenditure
126
analysis.
The intellectual legacy of tax expenditure analysis provides
arguably the most straightforward explanation for the dominant
conception of the EITC as presenting a binary choice between tax
and welfare administration. In this account, scholars of the EITC,
such as Weisbach and Nussim, have inherited from tax expenditure
analysis an inclination to view tax administration and traditional
welfare administration as counterposed alternatives, each with
distinct policy advantages and disadvantages. Tax expenditure
analysis counsels that if a tax expenditure produces undesirable
results, the logical solution is not to reform its administrative
apparatus but to eliminate it or recast it as a direct spending program.
The bulk of the discussion of the EITC's administration has followed
this same paradigm.
This account may help explain why EITC scholars have
neglected administrative reform, but it clearly cannot justify that

125. Id. at 1025.
126. For example, Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel recognized that tax
expenditures impose upon the IRS "the task of administering 105 spending
programs [in addition to the] enormously difficult and complex task of
normative income tax administration." SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 10, at 26.
Consistent with the basic methods of tax expenditure analysis, they saw this
observation not as counseling toward a greater focus on administrative reform,
but rather as raising questions as to "whether it would be administratively more
efficient to recast the various tax expenditures as direct programs." Id. at 27.
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neglect. There may well have been a time when it seemed politically
realistic to eliminate a significant number of tax expenditures (or to
recast them as direct spending programs) and therefore appropriate
to ask simply whether a given tax expenditure should be eliminated
or retained. However, as advocates of tax expenditure analysis have
recently begun to acknowledge, the discipline's traditional goals of
"expenditure control" through budget transparency-that is, the hope
that, as tax expenditures were identified and categorized as spending
programs, policymakers would come to eliminate them or recast them
as direct expenditures 12 7-have not materialized.1 28 If tax expenditure
analysis is to be reoriented to reflect the political resiliency of tax
expenditures, opportunities for administrative reform represent a
particularly fruitful realm of inquiry.
Now that it is apparent that tax expenditures such as the EITC
are an enduring component of the American policy landscape, it is
logical to focus not only on whether a given tax expenditure should be
eliminated or recast as a direct spending program, but also to focus on
the arguably more politically realistic question of whether a given tax
expenditure can be reformed to produce more efficient results that
are better aligned with an expenditure's policy goals. Therefore,
although EITC scholars' reluctance to propose administrative
reforms is consistent with that of tax expenditure analysis more
generally, it may be time to set that reluctance aside and consider
how such reforms might benefit the program.
2. Avoiding the Taint of "Welfare"
The scholarly tendency to perceive the EITC as presenting a
binary choice between tax and welfare administration can also be
understood as a reflection of the political anxieties afflicting EITC
advocates. Proponents of the EITC are perpetually vigilant against
the specter of "welfare." The anti-welfare political consensus of the
1980s and 1990s led to the dismantling of vast swaths of the nation's
social safety net. 129 While the bulk of anti-welfare sentiment was
directed at traditional transfer programs such Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, the EITC was also subjected to political attack
from skeptics who perceived the program as akin to traditional

127. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., supra note 12, at 2.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
129. See generally JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT (2006) (discussing the

link between ideologies of personal responsibility and "ownership society," and the
dismantling of traditional social safety nets).
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redistribution. 130 To the extent that the EITC survived the "welfare
reform" movement intact, it was largely by dint of the program's
success in distinguishing itself from traditional transfer programs.' 3
In the wake of this history, it has become an article of faith
among EITC proponents that the program should avoid association
with "welfare" in the national political consciousness. Thus, Professor
Dorothy Brown argues that references to the EITC as a "welfare"
program pose an existential threat, stating that "when the EITC is
referred to as 'welfare,' 'EITC' becomes a racially and politically
charged word. By referring to low-income taxpayers as welfare
recipients, politicians have jeopardized their tax benefits."' 32
Similarly, Professor Lawrence Zelenak frames the EITC as "a
transfer program with the protective coloration of a tax program."' 33
He argues that the ideology of "everyday libertarianism," which has
led to the dismantlement of various entitlement programs, operates to
"make underpayment of tax seem a less serious concern than
overreceipt of transfers."134

While Professors Brown and Zelenak are certainly correct that
the phrase "welfare" carries problematic political connotations, such
political sensitivities ultimately cannot justify EITC proponents'
unwillingness to explore administrative experiments for three
reasons. First, administrative experimentation can be undertaken
with an eye toward preserving the widespread perception of the EITC
as a tax program. Even if the IRS were to adopt relatively ambitious
administrative reforms involving practices traditionally associated
with welfare-for example, by establishing field offices in low-income
neighborhoods to help EITC applicants complete their tax returnsthe program's focus on working families would help provide it a
measure of protection from the political taint of welfare, as would the
fact that the program functioned as a refundable tax credit
administered by the IRS.' 35 Second, such political sensitivities

130. See Ventry, supra note 32, at 1004-07 (summarizing mid-1990s political criticism
of the EITC).
131. See id. at 1017 ("The EITC's survival depended ... on a receptive political
environment .... The EITC represented the perfect policy solution to a set of social
problems, and a welfare reform consensus that favored pro-work, pro-growth, low-cost
alternatives.").
132. Brown, supra note 20, at 810-11.
133. Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1903.
134. Id. at 1875.
135. This argument is somewhat speculative and I advance it tentatively. In analyzing
the desirability of any given hybrid administrative practice, the political risks of a reform
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probably overstate the extent to which the EITC's political viability is
dependent on its being perceived as a tax rather than a welfare
program. While the EITC no doubt benefits politically from the
perception that it is a tax program, a no less important source of the
program's political viability is the fact that, unlike traditional welfare
programs, it establishes paid employment as a prerequisite for the
receipt of benefits.13 6 Politicians touting the EITC consistently

emphasize the benefits that the program provides for "working
families" ' 37 or the "working poor." For example, in his 1994 State of
the Union Address, President Clinton exalted the expansion of the

EITC by emphasizing the program's work requirement:
Instead of taxing people with modest incomes into poverty, we
helped them to work their way out of poverty by dramatically
increasing the earned-income tax credit. It will lift 15 million

working families out of poverty, rewarding work over welfare,
making it possible for people to be successful workers and
successful parents. Now that's real welfare reform.13

Similarly, when Barack Obama made EITC expansion a prominent
part of his economic platform during the 2008 presidential
campaign,

39

media coverage framed the proposal not as a transfer

policy but rather as part and parcel of Obama's general promise of

as ambitious as the creation of EITC field offices should be taken seriously and weighed
against the reform's potential benefits.
136. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn't Make Work Pay, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2010, at 285, 287 ("From its earliest days, the EITC prospered
politically because it appeared to promote and reward paid work-helping answer the
charge that the negative income tax would support the idle."); see also Amy L. Wax,
Something for Nothing: Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Requirements, 52 EMORY L.J. 1,
3 (2003) ("Few outside the academy openly question the reigning tenet that the
government should help only those who help themselves. Politically there is widespread
acceptance of the idea that the 'quid pro quo' for public assistance is the willingness to
perform some kind of gainful activity.").
137. It is worth noting that the EITC's emphasis on providing benefits to families may
also be a political asset. The EITC provides a far larger credit to low-income families with
children than those without. CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS:
THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 1 (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files

/policybasics-eitc.pdf (reporting that in 2009, the average EITC for a family with children
was $2,770, as compared to a credit of $259 for a family with no children).
138. President William J. Clinton, supra note 32, at 129.
139. See OBAMA FOR AM., CHANGE WE CAN BELIEVE IN: BARACK OBAMA'S PLAN
To RENEW AMERICA'S PROMISE 163 (2008) ("Obama will increase the number of

working parents eligible for EITC benefits, increase the benefit available to parents who
support their children through child support payments, increase the benefit for families
with three or more children, and reduce the EITC marriage penalty, which hurts lowincome families.").
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tax cuts for working families.14° When, as part of a massive federal
stimulus, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009141
increased the size of the credit available to families with three or
more children and lowered the EITC's marriage penalty, 42 the
expansion was touted by the Obama White House as a key part of a
broader effort to provide tax relief to working Americans. 143 Such
rhetoric suggests that the EITC's targeting of working families
provides it with political cover beyond that provided by its status as a
tax program, and further suggests that the program may be on a
firmer political footing than some of its more pessimistic proponents
may be inclined to believe. In short, the worry that deviation from
pure tax procedure could harm the EITC's political viability likely
overestimates the political threats to the EITC and underestimates
the political benefits of the EITC's focus on working families.
Third, beyond overestimating the EITC's political vulnerability,
a heightened concern with welfare politics may be counterproductive.
As Professor Alstott notes, disguising the EITC's redistributive
functions and framing the program strictly as an alternative to welfare
is risky insofar as it "reinforces negative attitudes about welfare that,
in the long run, may jeopardize the cause of the EITC and of poverty
relief more generally."' Moreover, accepting inefficient and unfair
program features in anticipation of possibly imagined political threats
may amount to cutting off the program's nose to spite its face. For
example, to the extent that the EITC's high noncompliance rate (a
direct product of self-certification) is a major flashpoint for political
attacks upon the program,145 the EITC's reliance on unmodified tax
administration may itself entail significant political liability.
While the EITC, like all significant federal programs, must be
managed with an eye to long-term political viability, the EITC's focus
on working families provides it with a measure of insulation from
140. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, For Incomes Below $100,000, a Better Tax Break in
Obama's Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at A14.

141. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6, 19,
26,42 & 47 U.S.C.).
142. See § 1002(a)(3)(A)-(B), 123 Stat. at 312 (codified as amended at 26 I.R.C.
§ 32(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
143. See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec'y, President Obama
Underscores Commitment to Restoring Fairness to the Tax Code and Providing Tax
Relief to Working Americans (Apr. 15, 2009), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/the
-press -office/President-Obama-Underscores-Commitment-to-Restoring-Fairness-to-theTax-Code-and-P/.
144. Alstott, supra note 20, at 537.
145. See Ventry, supra note 32, at 1005-06 (discussing the mid-1990s congressional
hearings focused on EITC noncompliance).
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anti-welfare political sentiments. Administrative reforms that stand to
render the program more effective in fulfilling its antipoverty mission
should not be reflexively rejected due to traumas tracing to mid-1990s

controversies over welfare.
3. Institutional Design Considerations
A third possible explanation for scholars' binary conception of
EITC administration is that it is borne of EITC proponents'
attachment to the practical programmatic benefits of tax-based
administration. In this account, problems such as the EITC's high
noncompliance rates and the diversion of EITC funds to privately

paid preparers are inextricably linked to the benefits that make the
program appealing to many of its advocates, especially to the extent
that both the problems and the benefits are traceable to the
program's reliance on self-certification. 46 Although self-certification

may be a major cause

of the EITC's troubling levels of

noncompliance,' 47 it is also said to reduce the stigmatic harms of
traditional welfare and explain the higher levels of participation in the
EITC as compared to traditional welfare programs. 148 The EITC
enjoys significantly higher participation rates than the federal Food

Stamp program, which is administered through traditional welfare
channels: 89% of eligible individuals participate in the EITC, 1 as
49

compared to a 70% participation rate in the Food Stamp program.
Moreover, EITC advocates may view the EITC's noncompliance
epidemic as a programmatic feature, rather than a bug, saving

significant

sums on

administration

while

resulting

only

in

146. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 20, at 568 ("[T]he tax system might adopt separate,
welfare-like rules and procedures solely for purposes of a tax-based transfer program, but
that approach would tend to undermine the purported advantages of integration.").
147. See supra Part I.
148. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1915 ("In addition, the participation rate (that
is, the percentage of eligible persons who receive benefits) is much higher with the EITC's
self-declared eligibility than with the Food Stamp program's precertification
requirement."); see also Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 20, at 1004-05 (observing that the
EITC enjoys significantly higher participation rates than the federal Food Stamp program,
which is administered through traditional welfare channels: 89% of eligible individuals
participate in the EITC, as compared to a 70% participation rate in the Food Stamp
program).
149. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 20, at 1004-05. It should be noted that the high
participation rates ascribed to the EITC have been disputed. See generally Marsha
Blumenthal, Brian Erard & Chih-Chin Ho, Participationand Compliance with the Earned
Income Tax Credit, 58 NAT'L TAX J. 189 (2005) (arguing on the basis of economic analysis
that EITC participation rates are overstated due to overemphasis on participation rates
among eligible households with pre-existing obligations to file tax returns).
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"overpayments to the near-poor.""15 This position gains strength if
one accepts the arbitrariness of the poverty thresholds on which
EITC eligibility criteria are based.15 1
Such arguments from institutional design have some force, but
ultimately cannot justify an inflexible binary conception of EITC
administration. For one, the purported benefits of tax-based
administration are not unqualified. There is little empirical
foundation for the claim that the EITC is less stigmatizing than
traditional welfare. 52 To the degree that the EITC does carry less
stigma, this phenomenon may be attributable to the fact that the
program targets the working poor, rather than the utterly destitute.153
Likewise, a variety of qualifications are in order when
considering the EITC's participation rates. First, there is evidence
that these high participation rates hold only among applicants with a
pre-existing legal obligation to file tax returns. A 2005 study found
that while 89.0% of such filers participate in the EITC, among eligible
individuals who have no pre-existing obligation to file a tax return,
participation rates are far lower, between 30.6% and 39.0%.154
Second, scant attention has been paid to the possibility that the
EITC's relatively high participation rates may be attributable in
significant part to the fact that it targets a working-poor clientele,
rather than the indigent participant base of traditional welfare
initiatives such as the Food Stamp program. While there is little
empirical work on the subject, it seems highly likely that the desire to
seek out a job and the ability to secure one correlate positively with a
likelihood to apply for available benefits.155 Third, the fact that 68%
of EITC recipients effectively engage a privatized welfare

150. Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1915.
151. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 136, at 291-92 ("Most discussions of the EITC [make]
reference to the official U.S. poverty line, but as many scholars have pointed out, the
official statistics incorporate an unreasonably low standard of living, meaning that they
treat as 'poor' only those families in extreme distress. Today's official poverty statistics
adopt a low poverty threshold, but the nature of the measure is hidden by its methodology

and its aura of 'official' quality.").
152. See Alstott, supra note 20, at 535 ("Tax-based transfer programs may be cheaper
and less stigmatizing than welfare, although advocates typically assert these claims without
empirical support.").
153. See supra text accompanying notes 136-43.
154. See Blumenthal et al., supra note 149, at 207.
155. Blumenthal et al. argue in a similar vein that the EITC's relatively high
participation rates may be attributable to the fact that the programs to which it is
frequently compared, such as Food Stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
typically "target a large share of all benefits to low-income households with no legal filing
requirement." Id.
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bureaucracy by hiring private tax preparers to negotiate the credit's
complexities suggests that self-certification alone cannot explain the
EITC's relatively high participation rates. 56
Despite these qualifications, the EITC's relatively high
participation rates are among its most distinctive features and militate
in favor of retaining some form of tax administration. Even so, while
the institutional design account might counsel toward caution, it
cannot serve to justify a wholesale neglect to consider administrative
novelties that may avoid many of the policy anomalies currently
associated with the program. 157 The perceived advantages of tax
administration, namely, high participation rates, low administrative
costs, and reduced dignitary harms, can serve as guiding principles for
institutional designers who seek to improve the EITC while retaining
the qualities that have driven its success. For example, while creation
of EITC "outreach centers" featuring eligibility specialists who assist
applicants in completing their tax returns may well bear a
resemblance to traditional welfare administration, there is no reason
to believe that such an initiative, if executed with due regard for the
EITC's programmatic goals, would compromise the benefits of selfcertification. The notion of EITC outreach centers is discussed at
greater length in Part IV below. For the purposes of the present
discussion, it is sufficient to note that such a proposal does not
inherently stand to compromise the EITC's programmatic
effectiveness and that anxiety about participation rates and stigmatic
harms cannot license a complete unwillingness to explore
administrative experimentation.
B.

Embracing Hybridity

Given the shortcomings of the prevailing scholarly assumption
that the EITC's administrative form presents a binary choice between
tax and welfare administration, this Article offers an alternative
approach to the program's administration: administrative hybridity.158
156. See BERUBE ETAL., supra note 69, at 2.
157. See supra Part I.
158. The term "hybridity" is borrowed from the work of literary theorist Homi
Bhabha. Bhabha used the term primarily to refer to the "hybrid" culture and identity
arising from the melding of a colonialist culture with that of the colonized culture. See, e.g.,
Homi K. Bhabha, Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority
Under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817, 12 CRITICAL INQUIRY 144, 153-54 (1985)
("Produced through the strategy of disavowal, the reference of discrimination is always to
a process of splitting as the condition of subjection: a discrimination between the mother
culture and its bastards, the self and its doubles, where the trace of what is disavowed is
not repressed but repeated as something different-a mutation, a hybrid. It is such a
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This Article defines administrative hybridity as the selective
implementation of nontax administrative features in order to ensure
that reliance on tax administration does not compromise a tax
expenditure's nontax policy objectives. While the defining features of
"tax administration" are contestable, this Article uses the phrase
loosely to refer to the core administrative features of the U.S. tax
system, such as reliance on tax returns prepared by the taxpayer,'59
mechanical screening of tax returns for mathematical error, 161 the use
of audits to determine a tax return's accuracy, 61 and the use of the
U.S. Tax Court to adjudicate alleged taxpayer noncompliance. 162
The concept of administrative hybridity rests on two simple
assumptions. The first is that because the tax system's administrative
form evolved in response to revenue-collection imperatives rather
than social policy objectives, tax administration may often be a poor
fit for implementing social policy. Part I's discussion of the EITC's
administrative shortcomings provides ample evidence that, at least in
the case of the EITC, this assumption is valid. The second assumption
on which the concept of administrative hybridity relies is that tax
administration can be selectively modified, with attention to the
policy context and goals of specific tax expenditures, in order to
produce superior policy outcomes.
When a tax expenditure performs a function with a close
analogue in traditional direct expenditures, such as a subsidy for a
specific business activity, 163 there will often be a host of administrative
practices that can be borrowed from the traditional, direct
partial and double force that is more than the mimetic but less than the symbolic, that
disturbs the visibility of the colonial presence and makes the recognition of its authority
problematic."). See generally HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 144
(Rutledge Classics ed. 2004) (using the theory of cultural hybridity to describe colonial
cultures).
159. See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1869 (discussing taxpayers' certification of their
own tax liability as a distinguishing feature of tax administration).
160. See generally Bryan T. Camp, Theory and Practicein Tax Administration, 29 VA.
TAX REV. 227 (2009) (discussing the history and policy consequences of IRS reliance on
computerized mass processing of returns).
161. Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84
IND. L.J. 57, 61 (2009) ("The yearly discipline of self reporting and payment cannot be
divorced from the constant coercive threat of discovery and sanctions resulting from the
Orwellian system of third-party information reporting and Benthamite system of audit
selection.").
162. See William F. Nelson & James J.Keightley, Managing the Tax Court Inventory, 7
VA. TAX. REV. 451,452-53 (1988) (describing structure and function of the United States
Tax Court). For a more thorough discussion of tax administration and its limitations, see
infra text accompanying notes 319-37.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 337-56.
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expenditure to beneficial effect. To illustrate, a tax credit that is
meant to encourage particular investments within a specific industry
could potentially benefit from administrative practices traditionally
used by federal cabinet departments engaged in grant making.
Because bright-line rules tend to be over- and under-inclusive, 164 tax
administration's mechanical application of such rules will often fail to
effectively target the sorts of behaviors that a tax credit is meant to
encourage. Federal grant programs address the limitations of brightline rules by requiring that entities seeking a grant apply for the grant,
be preapproved, and periodically provide an administrator with
progress updates. Where bright-line rules are incapable of adequately
predefining the precise class of behaviors that a tax credit seeks to
promote, similar practices could be used to improve a tax credit's
targeting and effectiveness. 165
Similarly, where (as in the case of the EITC) a tax expenditure
provides a credit that is functionally equivalent to a welfare payment,
traditional welfare programs may provide time-tested administrative
practices that can be applied to the expenditure to produce fairer and
more efficient results than pure tax administration. Part III below
illustrates this premise by discussing the unfair and possibly
inaccurate results that are inevitable when unrepresented low-income
taxpayers are forced to defend their tax returns in a formal,
adversarial Tax Court setting, and suggests that more informal
adjudicative practices traditionally associated with benefits programs
such as Social Security Disability Insurance may provide fairer and
more accurate results.
Such proposals may seem impractical to those accustomed to the
norms and practices of American tax administration, but other
countries have successfully used such hybrid administrative practices
to improve the operation of their tax expenditures. For example, in
2004, New Zealand passed a comprehensive social welfare program
that is administered through the country's tax system, Inland
Revenue. 66 Inland Revenue accordingly undertook a comprehensive
"analytical redesign process" to change the culture, structure, and

164. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
L. REV. 1685, 1697 (1979) ("[T]he main disadvantage of general rules is their overand underinclusiveness from the point of view of the lawmaker's purposes.").
165. See infra text accompanying notes 356-64.
166. See Taxation (Working for Families) Act 2004 (N.Z.), available at http://www
.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2004/0052/latest/DLM299520.html.
HARV.
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emphasis of the agency, in recognition of its new dual mission.'67
Similarly, Canada delegates the administration of its tax credit for soil
and watershed conservation to Environment Canada, a federal
agency that must evaluate and preapprove any applications for the
credit. 168 These comparative examples suggest that tax expenditures
can realistically be administered using practices developed in nontax
contexts and that doing so need not necessarily compromise a given
expenditure's characterization as a tax program. To be sure, such
experimentation must be cautiously undertaken so as not to
compromise the benefits of tax administration. But careful, wellconsidered administrative reforms of tax expenditures could
potentially address certain shortcomings of tax administration while
preserving many of the advantages that it provides.
The concept of administrative hybridity also reveals that the
simplistic "tax vs. welfare" analysis that currently dominates EITC
scholarship masks an array of more subtle and particularized
institutional design choices at all stages of the program's
administration, beginning with the use of IRS posters and websites to
publicize the program and ending with the use of the U.S. Tax Court
to adjudicate claims of EITC noncompliance. These choices are not
rigidly predetermined by an initial decision to use either "tax" or
"welfare" administration. Rather, each such institutional design
choice is mutable and susceptible to individualized examination,
presenting tradeoffs and potential dynamic effects that merit focused
scholarly attention.
A 2009 National Taxpayer Advocate report acknowledged the
possibility and potential benefits of administrative hybridity. 169 The
report noted the incongruity between tax expenditures' social policy
objectives and the IRS's administrative focus on revenue collection,17 °
and suggested that "[w]ith the growth of [social] programs
administered by the IRS, the agency could consider revising its
mission statement to explicitly acknowledge its dual roles: tax
compliance and social program delivery." 17' While such fundamental
167. See 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: RUNNING SOCIAL PROGRAMS THROUGH THE TAX SYSTEM 87 (2009),
available at

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/vol2-socialprograms.pdf;

Robert

Russell,

New Zealand, in TAX
ADMINISTRATION: SAFE HARBOURS AND NEW HORIZONS 29, 29-31 (Chris Evans &
Managing Expanding Responsibilities: Inland Revenue

Michael Walpole eds., 2009).
168. See infra text accompanying notes 360-64.
169. See 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 19, at 85-87.

170. Id.
171. Id. at 87.
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structural reform of the IRS may be unrealistic in the near term,
EITC proponents can still identify opportunities to apply hybrid
administrative tools in order to better match the EITC's
administrative form to its antipoverty mission. The remainder of this
Article illustrates how the concept of administrative hybridity can be
deployed to improve the EITC, as well as tax expenditures more
generally. The mode of analysis that follows-in which discrete
administrative practices are subjected to critical scrutiny under the
assumption that administrative form matters to program results-is
not new. Indeed, a vast body of scholarship under the heading of
172
"institutional design" applies such analysis as a matter of course.
The fundamental premise of this Article is that EITC proponents
should bring a critical institutional design lens to bear on the EITC's
myriad pathologies and refuse to be constricted by the limitations of
tax administration. By the same token, policymakers and scholars
analyzing tax expenditures other than the EITC should devote
greater attention to questions of administrative form, rather than
simply assume that any program implemented through the tax code
must be administered using unmodified tax administration.
III. A CASE STUDY: ADVERSARIAL ADJUDICATION OF EITC
NONCOMPLIANCE

This Part uses a case study to illustrate how the concept of
administrative hybridity can be applied to improve EITC
administration. Specifically, it examines the use of adversarial
hearings in U.S. Tax Court to adjudicate the cases of EITC claimants
deemed ineligible for the credit following an IRS audit, and asks
whether alternative nontax practices might provide superior
outcomes. Much like self-certification, adversarial procedure in Tax
Court is a feature of tax administration that even at first glance seems
like a poor fit for the EITC. While a formal, adversarial setting may
be well-suited for the corporate and high-income taxpayers that are
parties to typical Tax Court proceedings, the low-income and often
172. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) (applying
institutional design theory to the enforcement and adjudicative roles of federal
prosecutors); Peter L. Strauss, On Capturing the Possible Significance of Institutional
Design and Ethos, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 259 (2009) (examining
institutional design issues in the context of several leading administrative law cases); Philip
J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative
State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675 (2009) (examining the FCC through institutional design
theory and arguing for increased attention to institutional competence in evaluating
agency regulations).
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pro se taxpayers typically found in EITC cases are not well-positioned
to vindicate their claims in an adversarial setting. Moreover, the
practice of subjecting low-income taxpayers to adversarial Tax Court
proceedings raises significant fairness concerns given that, as Part I
demonstrates, a high degree of error and ambiguity is built into the
EITC's eligibility apparatus. This Part considers whether adversarial
tax proceedings for EITC participants can be justified by analyzing a
sample of reported EITC Tax Court cases. Finding that the use of
adversarial hearings raises significant concerns regarding fairness and
efficiency, the Part sets forth an alternative hybrid (i.e. nontax)
administrative approach that might provide superior results.
The following discussion does not purport to offer a
comprehensive solution for the EITC's many problems. The use of
Tax Court procedures in the EITC context affects only the small
number of EITC claimants who both navigate the IRS's audit process
and affirmatively seek relief in Tax Court. Rather, the discussion that
follows provides a concrete, in-depth case study of administrative
hybridity and how it can be applied to the EITC to improve the
program's fairness and efficiency. The use of adversarial Tax Court
hearings is a fitting subject for such a case study both because of the
practice's limited reach-which allows alternative administrative
techniques to be considered with minimal concern for unanticipated
dynamic effects-and because of the fact that, as the following
discussion makes clear, the practice is quite difficult to justify. Thus,
while this Part does not set forth a panacea for the EITC's various
deficiencies, it illustrates a mode of analysis that stands to
substantially improve the EITC by bringing its administrative form
into line with its antipoverty mission. That same mode of analysis can
be applied to analyze and improve upon other aspects of the EITC's
administration, as well as other tax expenditures.
The Tax Court Context of EITC Adjudication
Tax Court adjudication of EITC claims takes place as part of the
IRS's "deficiency procedure," the process by which the IRS resolves
disputes with taxpayers.'73 When the IRS concludes that an individual
has underreported her tax liability, it initiates an audit process that
provides the individual with an opportunity to present information
concerning questionable entries on her return.174 The initial step of
A.

173. See I.R.C. §§ 6211-6216 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
174. For a comprehensive discussion of the mechanics of the IRS's audit process, see
MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ch. 8 (rev. 2d ed. 2005), and
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the audit process requires a decision by the IRS as to which of three
audit types to employ 75 : (1) a correspondence audit, in which the
taxpayer is contacted and furnishes requested information by mail;176
(2) an office audit, in which the taxpayer visits an IRS field office and
submits to an interview; 77 or (3) a field audit, in which IRS agents
examine a taxpayer's records at the taxpayer's home or place of
business. 7 ' Correspondence audits are generally employed for
disputes involving relatively simple tax liability issues, such as
itemized deductions for interest and medical expenses,'79 while field
audits are reserved for complex issues involving sophisticated
accounting questions. 8 0
The vast majority of EITC audits are correspondence audits. For
example, Lawrence Zelenak estimates that in 2002, the IRS
conducted 367,314 EITC correspondence audits, as compared to just
5,790 EITC field audits, and 4,655 EITC office audits. 1 ' These
correspondence audits begin with the mailing of a "thirty-day letter,"
which notifies the taxpayer of the alleged deficiency in her return and
provides a thirty-day window for the taxpayer to file an
administrative appeal and furnish any additional documentation the
taxpayer feels may favorably resolve the alleged deficiency."n
Taxpayers unable to successfully resolve their disputed tax liability
via correspondence may file an appeal with the IRS Office of
Appeals, which reviews the IRS audit record and may meet with
either the taxpayer or the auditing agent before issuing its findings. 183

Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administrationas InquisitorialProcessand the PartialParadigmShift
in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20-26 (2004).
175. See SALTZMAN, supra note 174, 8.03[l].
176. Id. 918.05[l].
177. Id.
178. Id. 918.06.
179. Id. 8.05[1].
180. Id. 8.06.
181. Zelenak, supranote 20, at 1885 n.74.
182. See Nina E. Olson, Taxpayer Rights, Customer Service, and Compliance:A Three
Legged Stool, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1239,1250-52 (2003) (describing use of thirty-day letters
in EITC correspondence audits).
183. See I.R.M. 8.1.1.1 (Oct. 23, 2007); Camp, supra note 174, at 24-25. Although the
appeals process's provision for conferences suggests an inquisitorial process of the sort
that this Article advocates for Tax Court, this process is of uncertain value in assuring
fairness to EITC claimants because a taxpayer's request for a conference can be
summarily denied by the IRS. See SALTZMAN, supra note 174, 919.03[1] (discussing cases
establishing that the statutory provision for conferences is discretionary, not mandatory,
and that denials of requests for a conference do not deprive taxpayers of due process of
law).
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If the appeals procedure does not result in a settlement, the
184
Appeals Office issues a "notice of deficiency" to the taxpayer.
Minutiae aside, a "deficiency" is essentially the amount by which a
taxpayer's true tax liability, as determined by the IRS after an audit
and appeal, exceeds the taxpayer's self-reported liability. 85 Following
the issuance of a notice of deficiency, the taxpayer has a ninety-day
window in which to seek a hearing before the U.S. Tax Court.186 The
Tax Court proceedings with which this Part is concerned begin if a
taxpayer seeks such a hearing. 187
Tax Court proceedings are hugely consequential to a taxpayer
whose return is disputed by the IRS: if the Tax Court finds that a
taxpayer's return is, indeed, deficient, or if the taxpayer does not
respond to the notice of deficiency within ninety days, an assessment
is entered against the taxpayer. 88 An assessment serves two
significant functions in the tax determination process. First, it
culminates the deficiency procedure, providing the IRS's final
determination of taxpayer liability for a given reporting period.
Second, it allows the IRS to collect any unpaid, assessed tax liability
via administrative channels, with judicial review in federal district
court precluded under the so-called "pay-first rule" until the taxpayer
has paid the full amount of the assessed deficiency.' 89 In this sense, an
assessment is analogous to a final administrative judgment of tax
liability.19

Tax Court procedure resembles the procedure followed in a
federal district court sitting without a jury.' 9' Most importantly for the

purposes of this Article, the Tax Court employs adversarial
procedures. Cases are tried before member judges' 92 (presidentially

184. See SALTZMAN, supra note 174, 1 9.0313][c][i].
185. See I.R.C. § 6211 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) ("Definition of a deficiency.").
186. See § 6213(a).
187. See §§ 6211-6216.
188. See § 6213(a).
189. Camp, supra note 161, at 59.
190. See Camp, supra note 174, at 20-21 ("[Tlhe idea of assessment is the critical
demarcation between the tax determination and tax collection processes. Assessments
serve as the Service's administrative judgment of what taxes a taxpayer owes the
government. A properly recorded assessment is the functional equivalent of a judgment
against the taxpayer.").
191. See SALTZMAN, supra note 174, 1 1.06[1].

192. Id. 1.06[1][b]. For instance, the Tax Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure
explicitly incorporate federal district court rules governing evidence. See U.S. TAX CT. R.
143 ("Trials before the Court will be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence
applicable in trials without a jury in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.").
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appointed judges who serve fifteen-year terms of office) 193 using rules

of procedure similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.194 The
Commissioner of the IRS is represented by attorneys from the Office
of the IRS Chief Counsel. 195 This adversarial enterprise has a
decidedly pro-governmental tilt: the IRS's determinations of a
deficiency are presumptively correct and the taxpayer faces the
burden of proof for establishing error. 196
These harsh trial procedures are mitigated somewhat by the
small-case procedures provided for in the Tax Court's Rules of
Practice and Procedure for deficiency proceedings in which the
amount in dispute does not exceed $50,000 for a given tax year. 97
Such proceedings, commonly referred to as "S" cases, 198 entail a
number of procedural compromises intended to facilitate pro se
representation. After filing a petition, the taxpayer is not required to
file a reply to the government's answer, neither briefs nor oral
arguments are required, and trials are "conducted as informally as
possible consistent with orderly procedure."' 99 However informal "S"
cases may be, the proceedings retain the fundamental incidents of a
trial: the burden of proof remains on the taxpayer, who is still
opposed by an IRS attorney.
This deficiency procedure, consisting of correspondence-based
audits and adversarial Tax Court hearings, may be well-suited to the
middle- and upper-income taxpayers typically associated with Tax
Court proceedings. However, these procedures present a number of
dilemmas when applied without modification to low-income
taxpayers who, for a variety of reasons, are not optimally situated to
zealously vindicate their claims in such a setting. The next Section
examines a sample of EITC Tax Court cases to evaluate how EITC
claimants tend to fare in Tax Court.
B.

The AdversarialProcedurein Practice:A Case Analysis

To evaluate whether adversarial Tax Court proceedings are an
appropriate method for the adjudication of EITC cases, consider a
sample of EITC Tax Court cases reported by the CCH Research
193. See I.R.C. § 7443(e) (2006).
194. SALTZMAN, supra note 174, 1.06[2][a].
195. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 7452 (2006)).
196. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
197. See DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX
PROCEDURE 222 (2d ed. 2007).

198. Id.
199. U.S. TAX Cr. R. 173(c), 174(b)-(c).
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Network. 20 As will be explained more fully below, these cases suggest
that adversarial process is an inappropriate vehicle for EITC
adjudication in two respects. First, a number of the analyzed cases
were "easy cases"-cases in which the taxpayer's compliance or
noncompliance was easily ascertainable through a cursory
examination of the relevant and easily ascertained facts. In such cases,
adversarial adjudication arguably provides too much process,
siphoning both government and defendant resources toward
resolution of issues that could be conclusively adjudicated in a less
resource-intensive manner. Second, in closer "hard cases," adversarial
process appears to pose serious obstacles to low-income, often pro se

taxpayers who may lack the skills and resources needed to effectively
present their case in an adversarial litigation setting. In such hard
cases, the mismatch between the exigencies of adversarial litigation
and the resources of EITC litigants arguably leads to inaccurate and

unfair results. In short, adversarial Tax Court hearings employ too
200. The cases selected were those reported under the "Earned Income Credit:
Eligibility" heading on the CCH Internet Tax Research Network in April 2009. Earned
Income Credit:Eligibility, 1 Stand. Fed. Income Tax Rep. Online (CCH) 4082.35 (2011).
The forty-six cases listed under this heading were culled to remove post-assessment cases
taking place in federal district court, cases involving patently frivolous claims, and cases
involving issues far-removed from mainstream EITC compliance controversies, such as
those addressing prison inmate EITC eligibility. The remaining twenty-nine cases, which
involved Tax Court adjudication of standard EITC compliance issues between 1996 and
2008, were then examined to determine how Tax Court procedures impact EITC litigants.
It should be noted that in few of the cases was the EITC the sole issue being adjudicated;
in most, credits and deductions often claimed by low-income working families-such as
the child tax credit and the dependent care exemption-were adjudicated as well.
Although this Article restricts itself to the EITC, it is worth noting that many of the
pathologies and anomalies produced by adversarial adjudication of the EITC may well
hold in these related contexts.
This sample is limited in some respects. First, and most notably, it is small in size,
consisting, as it does, of only twenty-nine cases that took place over thirteen years. Second,
the cases in the sample may be atypical because the vast majority of EITC deficiency cases
never arrive in Tax Court. Tax Court jurisdiction is not invoked unless a taxpayer
exercises the option for a hearing within ninety days of receiving a deficiency notice.
Given the unique challenges that working-poor recipients of the EITC face, it may be that
large numbers of EITC claimants lack the time, resources, or skills required to pursue the
option of Tax Court adjudication. Third, the sample is limited due to the opacity of the
criteria by which cases are selected for inclusion in CCH's reports. The reports may consist
of a casually compiled sample, or they may reflect deliberate criteria with the potential to
substantively skew the sample along a number of vectors that are difficult to detect.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the sample provides an instructive window into
the actual practice of EITC adjudication in the Tax Court. To that end, this Section
discusses broad trends evident throughout the sample, as well as the specifics of particular
cases. This descriptive exercise, in turn, can help answer whether the use of adversarial
Tax Court proceedings to adjudicate instances of EITC noncompliance is either efficient
or otherwise normatively desirable.
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much process to resolve easy cases and inappropriate process to
resolve hard ones.
1. Overview of Results
Two notable phenomena stand out in this sample. First, the
EITC claimants often did not prevail in their Tax Court deficiency
proceedings. Claimants were awarded the credit in only five of the
twenty-nine cases examined. In the other twenty-four cases examined,
the taxpayer claiming the EITC was deemed ineligible. Second, the
claimants in this sample tended to enter Tax Court without
professional representation. Only five of the twenty-nine cases
involved taxpayers represented by counsel; the remaining twenty-four
involved pro se taxpayers." 1
The sample does provide one potential explanation for the fact
that the claimants tended to fare poorly in Tax Court: nineteen of the
twenty-nine cases examined were "easy" cases of noncompliance that
the court dispatched with little difficulty. These cases frequently
turned on straightforward bright-line rules such as a married
individual's failure to file a joint tax return (eleven cases) and the
taxpayer's clear failure to establish the residency of a qualifying child
(three cases). Of the remaining ten cases in the sample, only two
constituted straightforward cases of taxpayer compliance, in which
the court awarded the credit with little difficulty, while three others
were difficult cases which the taxpayer ultimately won. Finally, five of
the twenty-nine cases were hard cases in which complex questions of
fact were decided unfavorably to the taxpayer. What is troubling in
looking at these hard cases decided unfavorably to the taxpayer is
that the process employed appears to have disfavored the taxpayer to
such an extent that there is little basis for confidence that the
cases were properly (i.e. accurately) decided. The remainder of
this Section first looks at these hard cases more closely, before
analyzing whether, given the prevalence of easy cases and the
201. Although, for the reasons stated above, this Article refrains from generalizing too
broadly on the basis of this sample, the notion that EITC claimants enjoy limited access to
counsel is consistent with both the work of other commentators, such as Book, supra note
24, at 411-20, and with the common-sense notion that the relatively small amount in
controversy in such proceedings renders professional representation unrealistic. See
William C. Whitford, The Small Case Procedure of the United States Tax Court: A Small
Claims Court that Works, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 797,797 (describing creation of Tax

Court's small-claims procedure as a response to the needs of pro se litigants in cases where
the amount in controversy rendered retention of legal counsel "economically
impractical"). It may be worth noting that of the five taxpayers in this sample who were
represented by counsel, only one was awarded the credit in Tax Court.
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dilemmas posed by hard cases, the use of Tax Court for EITC
adjudication can be justified.

Table: Summary of Cases
Case

Citation

EITC

Taxpayer
Pro Se

Prevailing
Party

Hard
.
/Easy

Anderson v.

95 T.C.M. (CCH)

Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

Yes

IRS

Hard

No

IRS

Hard

Comm'r

1148 (2008).

Baker v.

91 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Comm'r

949 (2006).

Child

Blore v.

80 T.C.M. (CCH)

Proof of

Comm'r

559 (2000).

Income

Chappell v.

81 T.C.M. (CCH)

Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

1781 (2001).

Chiosie v.

79 T.C.M. (CCH)

Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

1812 (2000).

Coats v.

85 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Yes

Taxpayer

Hard

Comm'r

1030 (2003).

Child

Cotton v.

80 T.C.M. (CCH)

Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

594(2000).

Diaz v.

87 T.C.M. (CCH)

Marital

Yes

IRS

Hard

Comm'r

1420 (2004).

Status

Haywood v.

84 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

442 (2002).

Child

Hughes v.

79 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

No

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

1945 (2000).

Child

Lear v.

88 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

420 (2004).

Child

Lestrange v.

74 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

No

Taxpayer

Hard

Comm'r

685 (1997).

Child

Madrigal v.

76 T.C.M. (CCH)

Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

537 (1998).

Manukainiu v.

75 T.C.M. (CCH)

Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

1919 (1998).

Merriweather

84 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Yes

IRS

Easy

v. Comm'r

294 (2002).

Child
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Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

76 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Yes

IRS

Hard

Comm'r

1004 (1998).

Child

Powers v.

79 T.C.M. (CCH)

Proof of

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

1287 (2000).

Income

Presley v.

72 T.C.M. (CCH)

Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

1530 (1996).

Rasco v.

77 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Yes

Taxpayer

Easy

Comm'r

2031 (1999).

Child

Redmond v.

96 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

No

IRS

Hard

Comm'r

414(2008).

Child

Rowe v.

128 T.C. 13 (2007).

Qualifying

Yes

Taxpayer

Hard

Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

Yes

IRS

Easy

No

IRS

Easy

Mischel v.

74 T.C.M. (CCH)

Comm'r

253 (1997).

Newsom v.

78 T.C.M. (CCH)

Comm'r

415 (1999).

Perez v.

Child

Comm'r
Shinault v.

91 T.C.M. (CCH)

Comm'r

1306 (2006).

Smith v.

74 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Comm'r

1344 (1997).

Child

Sutherland v.

81 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Comm'r

1001 (2001).

Child

Toney v.

88 T.C.M. (CCH)

Filing Status

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

24 (2004).

Vidmar v.

77 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Yes

Taxpayer

Easy

Comm'r

2030 (1999).

Child

Wooten v.

79 T.C.M. (CCH)

Qualifying

Yes

IRS

Easy

Comm'r

1526 (2000).

Child

2. The Hard Cases
In all five of the "hard cases," where the government prevailed,
ultimately came down to a low-income taxpayer's inability
dispute
the
to provide affirmative evidence for a complex proposition in the face
of an unfavorable burden of proof. 2° Crucially, such cases often turn

202. See, e.g., Blore v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 559, 561 (2000) ("Petitioner bears
the burden of proving the determinations set forth by [the IRS] in the statutory notices of
deficiency to be in error." (citing Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933)).
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on unconventional family arrangements and income sources that may
be very difficult for a low-income taxpayer to conclusively establish
several years after-the-fact. °3 In more than one case, the Tax Court
itself recognized the plausibility of the taxpayer's contentions and
invoked the failure to meet the burden of proof as its reason for
rejecting the taxpayer's case. 2°4
Because a wide variety of adjudicatory mechanisms will
presumably be effective in resolving easy cases, an adjudicatory mode
might be fairly evaluated by its success in disposing of hard cases.
These five cases suggest that in the EITC context, the Tax Court may
tend to produce results that are both unfair to low-income claimants
and of questionable accuracy. Admittedly, these five cases provide
only a glimpse into the realities of EITC adjudication. But it is
nonetheless a troubling glimpse of a system that, in difficult cases,
asks low-income litigants with limited resources and expertise to
overcome an unfavorable burden of proof in a formal, one-off setting.
25
a. Baker v. Commissioner 1
EITC criteria require the taxpayer to establish that a claimed
qualifying child had the "same principal place of abode as the
taxpayer for more than one-half of such taxable year. ' 20 6 The pro se
taxpayer in Baker claimed that his daughter was a qualifying child for
purposes of EITC eligibility. 27 The taxpayer lived separately from the
child's mother and the couple had no custody agreement, although
the child's mother received public assistance for the child's benefit
from the State of Delaware, which listed her as the daughter's
custodial parent. 28 A family friend of the taxpayer regularly babysat
the daughter, although she did so in her own home and did not
observe the daughter in the defendant's home until he moved to a
new property late in the tax year.20 9
In support of his claim that his daughter resided with him for
more than one-half of the tax year, the taxpayer provided his own

203. See, e.g., Baker v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 949, 949 (2006) (adjudicating legal
details and legal significance of complex family arrangements three years after the tax year
in which the credit was claimed).
204. See, e.g., Blore, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) at 562 (acknowledging the taxpayer "produced
some evidence tending to show that he received wages for services rendered in 1995
through 1997" and relying upon burden of proof to deny the credit).
205. 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 949 (2006).
206. I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
207. Baker, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 952.
208. Id. at 950.
209. Id.
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testimony, that of his mother, and that of the child's babysitter.21 ' The
court straightforwardly rejected this evidence:
We found the testimony of petitioner to be in material respects
conclusory, vague, self-serving, and uncorroborated by reliable
evidence. We found the testimony of petitioner's mother to be
in material respects not based upon her personal knowledge,
conclusory, and serving the interests of her son petitioner. We
found the testimony of Ms. Srase [the babysitter] to be in
material respects not based upon her personal knowledge,
conclusory, and serving the interests of her longtime friend
petitioner. We are not required to, and we shall not, rely on the
testimonies of petitioner, his mother, and Ms. Srase in order to
establish petitioner's position with respect to the issues
presented in this case."'
Having thus rejected the testimony provided by the taxpayer, the
court found the record "devoid of evidence that we consider to be
reliable supporting [the taxpayer's] position that ...he maintained as

his home a house-hold that constituted the principal place of abode,
as a member of such household, of his daughter ...for more than

one-half of that year."2 2 It accordingly invalidated the taxpayer's
EITC claim.213
24

b. Diaz v. Commissioner 1
The EITC's eligibility criteria require that married individuals
file joint tax returns in any year for which they claim the credit, but
provide an exception for "[c]ertain married individuals living apart" if
"during the last 6 months of the taxable year, such individual's spouse
is not a member of such household. ' 215 In Diaz, the pro se taxpayer's
EITC claim was disallowed by the IRS because the taxpayer had
failed to file a joint return with his wife, who left the United States for
Mexico during the tax year.21 6 At issue in Diaz was whether the
taxpayer's wife had remained in the taxpayer's household for more
than six months
in 2001-that is, whether she had left for Mexico
217
July.
before
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 951.
Id.
Id. at 952.
Id.
87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1420 (2004).
I.R.C. § 7703(b) (2006).
See Diaz, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1420.
See id. at 1421.
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The court found that the taxpayer, who appeared to have limited
English-language proficiency, "made vague and inconsistent
assertions as to when his wife left his household." '18 Specifically, it
found the taxpayer's credibility undermined by two statements,
neither of which was facially inconsistent with the taxpayer's claim
that his wife was not a member of his household during the last six
months of the tax year.2 19 Noting that the record contained ambiguity
as to whether the defendant's wife left in June or July of the tax year,
the court held that "[i]n the absence of reliable evidence that she left
prior to July 2001, petitioner
is not entitled to the earned income tax
22
credit under section 32(a).
221
c. Blore v. Commissioner
In Blore, the counseled taxpayer sought the EITC for income he
claimed to have earned from freelance architectural drafting
conducted over the course of three years. 222 The IRS disallowed the
taxpayer's credit because the income reported on the W-2 forms
submitted in support of the claim was never reported to the IRS by
any of the listed employers. 223 In addition to the W-2s, the taxpayer
provided an array of hand-written receipts for the services, the sums
of which did not correspond to income stated on the W-2s.224
According to the taxpayer's testimony, the firms employing him were
run by an individual who changed his name during the course of the
taxpayer's employment and issued several bad checks, leading to an
arrangement in which the taxpayer was typically paid in cash.225

218. Id.
219. Id. First: "I believe she left between June and July of 2001." Id. Second: "But she
was not living with me during the whole period of 2001, because, when I moved, it was
about six months that she was not even living with me. She moved-she moved-she left
the apartment with her mother that came from Mexico and she decided to leave." Id.
Though not rife with detail, it is not readily apparent what aspects of this testimony were
sufficiently vague or unclear as to undermine the taxpayer's testimony. The court
emphasized that "[o]nly in his answering brief does petitioner state categorically that his
wife left in June" and refused to credit the brief as evidence. Id. However, the second of
the taxpayers aforementioned statements could certainly be read as a statement that his
wife left in June. The court's emphasis on "categorical statements" probably
disadvantaged the taxpayer, who, based upon his testimony and certain briefings
excerpted in the decision, appears to have had limited English-language proficiency.
220. Id.
221. 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 559 (2000).
222. Id. at 561.
223. Id. at 560.
224. Id. at 561.
225. Id.
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Two witnesses testified on the taxpayer's behalf. The taxpayer's
son testified to observing a meeting between the petitioner and his
putative employer "for a brief moment," apparently contradicting the
taxpayer's claim that the son was present "almost every time the
[putative employer] came by, especially whenever he would pay
me. ' 226 The taxpayer's neighbor testified to sitting in a truck several
years previously while the petitioner cashed a check, and could not
recall having met the putative employer, apparently contradicting the
taxpayer's testimony that he had met the employer on several
occasions. 227 After summarizing the evidence, the court concluded
that
[a]lthough petitioner produced some evidence tending to show
that he received wages for services rendered in 1995 through
1997, viewing the record as a whole we find that this evidence is
outweighed both by the inconsistencies in the testimony of the
witnesses, noted above, and by the dearth of evidence in several
key areas. 228
d.

Redmond v. Commissioner

229

The counseled taxpayer in Redmond provided care for two
children of a woman she claimed was her half-sister while the woman
recovered from cancer. The taxpayer claimed that each of the
children was a "qualifying child" for purposes of calculating her EITC
eligibility. Under the EITC's qualifying child criteria, to establish that
the children qualified, it was necessary for the taxpayer to
demonstrate that the children's mother was, in fact, her half-sister.230
The taxpayer sought to establish this relationship on the basis of
information received during childhood that she and the children's
mother were fathered by the same man. 231 However, neither her birth
certificate nor that of her putative half-sister listed a father, 23 2 and the
attorney representing the IRS submitted a Social Security
Administration database result contradicting the taxpayer's claim as
226. Id. at 561-62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. Id. at 562.
228. Id.
229. 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 414 (2008).
230. See I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining qualifying children with
reference to I.R.C. § 152(c), which provides that "[a qualifying child] bears a relationship
to the taxpayer described in this paragraph if such individual is ...a brother, sister,
stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer or a descendant of any such relative." I.R.C.
§ 152(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
231. Redmond, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 415.
232. Id.
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to her father's identity.233 While the court recognized that the IRS's
evidence was potentially flawed 3 4 and credited the taxpayer's
testimony as to her father's identity as sincere,235 it nevertheless held
that the taxpayer did not satisfy the relationship test by a
preponderance of the evidence and denied her claim.23 6
e.

Perez v. Commissioner237

In Perez, the pro se taxpayer seeking the EITC lived in a
household with an extended family network that included his
stepfather, his wife, his wife's sister, and his wife's nephew. 238 The
taxpayer claimed that his wife's nephew constituted a "qualifying
child" for purposes of EITC eligibility. 23 9 Because he was neither the
taxpayer's child nor step-child, the taxpayer's nephew could qualify as
an eligible child under the law at the time (since amended) only if he
was an "eligible foster child" who had the same principal place of
tax year and for whom
abode as the taxpayer throughout the relevant
' 24°
"the taxpayer care[d] for as [his] own child.
The opinion's finding of facts is sparse, tersely describing the
taxpayer's living situation, income, and rent obligations. The opinion
makes no mention of any testimony being taken, and the facts appear
derived entirely from the stipulation of the parties and certain
exhibits. 241 Based upon this limited record, the court held that
although the taxpayer lived in the same residence as his claimed
"qualifying child" for the entire tax year, there was no evidence that
he cared for the child as his own, especially given the presence of
other adults in the household who might have cared for the child. The
court thus held that the child did not qualify as a "foster child" and

233. Id.
234. See id. at 415 n.5. Particularly, the court noted that the database from which the
document was derived was not completely reliable and that because the document was
based on information received when the taxpayer was thirteen years old, its accuracy as to
the taxpayer's birth father was suspect. Id.
235. Id. at 415.
236. Id.
237. 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 1004 (1998).

238. Id. at 1004-05.
239. Id. at 1006.
240. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11111(a),
104 Stat. 1388,1388-410 to -411 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(f)(1)(C) (2006 & Supp. IV
2010)). The above summary describes the state of the "foster child" provision as it stood in
1996, when Perez was adjudicated; it has since been amended to require that the child be
placed with the taxpayer by an authorized agency. I.R.C. § 152(f)(1)(C).
241. See Perez, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1005.
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that the EITC's relationship test was not satisfied. 242 In doing so, the
court adduced no evidence tending to disprove the taxpayer's claim,
finding simply that "[t]here is not sufficient evidence in this record
indicating that petitioner cared for [the nephew] as his own child.
[the
There were other members of petitioner's household, including
' 243
nephew's] mother, who were available to care for the child."
3. Lessons
Both the hard and easy cases in the sample suggest that
adversarial Tax Court adjudication is a suboptimal mechanism for
EITC adjudication. Beginning with the hard cases, it is possible that
in each of the five cases discussed above, the claimant was, in fact,
ineligible for the EITC and that the adversarial process produced a
just and accurate result. However, these cases suggest that even were
the claimants legitimately eligible for the credit, the Tax Court's
formal, adversarial process would have made it extremely difficult for
them to prevail. The above cases therefore suggest at least two
structural obstacles to the success of low-income litigants in Tax
Court.
The first is communicative. Both EITC claimants and any
witnesses they might marshal in support of their claim will often be
challenged to effectively communicate in a formal, adversarial setting.
Low-income litigants may be functionally illiterate, speak English as a
second language, lack fluency with legal concepts, and be unfamiliar
with the idioms of middle-class English.24 Moreover, as Professor
Lucie White notes, civil litigation, with its emphasis on formality and
conflict, "evoke[s] feelings of terror for many poor people. ' 245 Based
on her experience as an advocate for low-income litigants, White
argues that:
[T]he majority of poor people perceive litigation as an alien or
even hostile cultural setting. The talk and ritual of litigation
constitute a discourse and a culture that are foreign to most
poor people. Poor people obviously do not speak in the same
dialect that lawyers, judges, and elite businesspeople use.
Furthermore, their courtroom speech is routinely interrupted
by lawyers and judges who use threatening tones in ordering
242. Id. at 1006.
243. Id.
244. See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court. Participationand Subordinationof Poor
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process,20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 536 (1992).
245. Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit. Making Space for
Clients To Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535,543 (1987).
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them when not to talk and what not to say. Their stories are
interpreted by black-robed authorities on the basis of rules that
are rarely explained and norms that they seldom share.246
These cultural difficulties facing low-income civil litigants are largely
a function of these litigants' inability to adjust to the formal
communicative norms that prevail in a courtroom setting. Consider,
for example, Professor Barbara Bezdek's study of Baltimore rent
courts. Applying categories first developed by linguist Robin Lakoff
to contrast the speech tendencies of men and women,247 Bezdek
found that poor rent court litigants were likely to engage in a
communicative style associated with "politeness," rather than a
competing form of expression associated with "transmission of factual
knowledge."248 As a consequence, she found low-income tenants in
rent court are generally not "credited with accurate or trustworthy
reporting," a factor contributing to their low success rates in rent
court litigation. 49 Bezdek's findings are consistent with those of
empirical social science research that distinguishes between the
"powerful" speech typical of well-educated white collar speakers (i.e.
unequivocal and assertive statements) and the "powerless" speech of
poor and uneducated speakers (i.e. equivocal and deferential
statements).25 ° She concludes that legal factfinders generally find
witnesses employing the former to be more convincing, competent,
251
intelligent, and trustworthy than witnesses who use the latter.
The formal setting of Tax Court proceedings thus has unique
implications for the receipt of testimony. Low-income litigants and
witnesses are more likely to be psychologically affected by the
adversarial, high-stakes setting of a court proceeding than they would
be by a more informal office encounter that typifies many welfare
adjudications. In turn, because such witnesses may have trouble
adequately engaging in the forms of expression required in litigation,
judges may well be more inclined toward skepticism in the context of
an adversarial hearing than they would be in a less formal

246. Id. at 542-43 (footnotes omitted).
247. See generally ROBIN LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE (Mary
Bucholtz ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (1975) (proposing linguistic categories to describe
the speech differences of men and women, and arguing that these differences reflect
viewpoints regarding the role of women in society).
248. Bezdek, supra note 244, at 583-84.
249. Id. at 585.
250. See John M. Conley, William M. O'Barr & E. Allan Lind, The Power of
Language: PresentationalStyle in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1380.
251. Id. at 1385-86.
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encounter.2 2 Because so much of EITC eligibility rests upon
questions of family circumstance, many of the questions that must be
resolved in EITC cases will ultimately be heavily dependent on
testimony. Household-specific questions-such as whether a taxpayer
cared for a child residing in their household "as their own"25 -- are
not necessarily susceptible to proof via documentary evidence. The
communicative challenges encountered by low-income litigants in
Tax Court are also likely to be heightened by the fact that the IRS
lawyers against whom EITC claimants square off are consummate
repeat players, possessing expertise and fluency in Tax Court
rituals.Y4
The effects of such communicative barriers are readily apparent
in the above discussion of Diaz v. Commissioner, where the judge
faulted a taxpayer who appeared to have significant difficulty with
English for "vague and inconsistent assertions. ' 25 5 One might
similarly view the predicament of the taxpayer in Baker v.
Commissioner-where, without providing explanation, the judge
summarily rejected the testimony of the taxpayer and his low-income
witnesses as conclusory, vague, and biased by the taxpayer's
interests 2 56-as evidencing the difficulty that low-income taxpayers
face in surmounting judicial skepticism by using the "transmission of
factual knowledge" idiom required to prevail in adversarial litigation.
The second structural obstacle to the success of low-income
litigants in Tax Court is evidentiary. While the EITC's rule structure
is replete with bright lines, the types of evidence required to
demonstrate eligibility may be difficult for plaintiffs to anticipate,
compile, and effectively present without the prompting of an
experienced advocate. In all five of the above cases, taxpayers
provided testimonial and documentary evidence that tended, to
252. See id.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 240, 242-43.
254. See Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients
Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1253 (2006) ("Experience and expertise may be particularly
helpful in Tax Court cases, where the IRS is always represented and, in fact, is represented
by counsel who routinely sees numerous similar cases; the IRS benefits from an
asymmetry in expertise and familiarity with the Tax Court when facing an unrepresented
taxpayer."); cf Bezdek, supra note 244, at 575 (noting that landlord advocates in rent
court enjoy a distinct communicative advantage by virtue of "know[ing] things that the
tenant does not, such as who the people are, who has certain authority, what to expect, the
language used, and the procedure utilized").
255. Diaz v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1420, 1421 (2004); see supra text accompanying
notes 214-20.
256. Baker v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 949, 951 (2006).
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varying degrees, to corroborate their claims, and in all five cases this
evidence was simply deemed insufficient to meet their burden of
proof. The cases involve challenging evidentiary burdens for the
taxpayers: What evidence, beyond provision of W-2s and receipts, will
suffice to establish income for a taxpayer who is paid in cash by an
unreliable independent contractor? 257 What evidence will allow a
taxpayer with unstable living arrangements and complex family
circumstances to establish that his daughter resided in his place of
abode for more than half of a given tax year?258 Presumably, every
adjudicator has an answer to such questions. Current practices expect
usually uncounseled low-income taxpayers to divine the answer in
anticipation of a formal, one-off hearing. In light of the challenging
circumstances often facing low-income taxpayers,259 this expectation
may be both unrealistic and unfair.
While it is perfectly possible that any or all of the taxpayers in
the hard cases discussed above were not, in fact, eligible for the
EITC, the cases nonetheless illuminate a procedural scheme that is
structurally unfavorable to the efforts of low-income taxpayers. This
observation raises two related concerns. The first pertains to
accuracy, as the above cases suggest that meritorious EITC claims
may be rejected due to the impediments that the Tax Court's
procedures impose upon EITC claimants. The second is normative:
troubling questions about fair treatment are raised by a system that
first requires low-income workers to determine their own eligibility
for benefits based on complex criteria, and then requires them to
defend their determination in a formal, adversarial setting without
assistance of counsel. These normative concerns are heightened when
one considers the consequences of a finding that an EITC claimant
was, in fact, ineligible for the credit: the claimant must generally
repay the entirety of the credit received (often exceeding $2,000) with
interest. 2 ° Given that Tax Court proceedings often conclude several
257. See Blore v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 559, 561 (2000); see supra text
accompanying notes 221-28.
258. See Baker, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 951; see supra text accompanying notes 205-13.
259. See Book, supra note 24, at 396-405 (discussing the unique challenges often facing
low-income workers, including transiency and homelessness, illiteracy, lack of
understanding of the EITC, fear of government, distrust or unfamiliarity with financial
institutions, and language barriers).
260. See, e.g., Baker, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 949, 953 (entering assessment of $3,556);
Diaz, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1420-21 (entering assessment of $5,179); see also SALTZMAN,
supra note 174, 6.02(1) ("On assessment, the taxpayer will be sent a notice of the
assessment of the tax and accrued interest, and demand for its payment. If the taxpayer
fails or refuses to pay the assessment, the Service will take enforced collection action, such
as a levy, against the taxpayer to collect the tax, including interest.").
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years after the receipt of the credit, such a disposition can amount to
a financial catastrophe for a low-income individual with limited
savings.6

The easy cases in the sample likewise suggest that Tax Court
adjudication is not an ideal mechanism for adjudicating EITC cases.
Each of the easy cases involved straightforward determinations of
eligibility of the sort made regularly by welfare offices throughout the
country using non-adversarial procedures. Even under the small-case
procedure that is generally employed by the Tax Court for EITC
disputes, the use of adversarial procedures to make these
determinations is relatively resource-intensive. For one, it requires
the use of special trial judges-generally veteran tax lawyers based in
Washington D.C. who must travel throughout the country to hear
cases.262 Additionally, it requires an active prosecution provided by
the office of the IRS Chief Counsel. 263 And, though less formal than
regular Tax Court procedure, it requires the observation of certain
formalities, such as the drafting of a taxpayer's petition and the
government's answer, as well as the drafting of written opinions
which must be reviewed by the Chief Judge of the United States Tax
Court prior to issuance. 264 To the extent that the decisions being made
do not significantly differ in substance or complexity from
conventional welfare eligibility decisions, the use of such intensive
practices may be regarded as costly overkill.
C. A "Hybrid"Alternative
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the tax system's
default procedure for adjudicating compliance-adversarial tax court
adjudication-is a poor fit for adjudicating the claims of often pro se
EITC claimants. The principle of administrative hybridity2 65 counsels
that institutional designers intent on addressing such a poor fit should
consider whether any nontax administrative practices might improve
upon the tax system's usual procedure. Here, one nontax
administrative practice readily presents itself as an alternative to
adversarial EITC adjudication: the informal inquisitorial process used
261. It should be noted, however, that taxpayers who are unable to immediately repay
the entirety of their liability can negotiate with the IRS for various alternatives to
immediate full payment. See Camp, supranote 161, at 65.
262. See Whitford, supra note 201, at 801-02 (describing the role of special trial judges
in hearing small-claim cases).
263. See supra text accompanying note 195.
264. See U.S. TAX CT. R. 182(a).
265. See supra Part II.B.
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to adjudicate applicant eligibility in various social benefit programs
that are administered outside of the tax system.2 6 6 While this Article
does not set forth a detailed adjudicative scheme,267 it argues that
such a collaborative, inquisitorial process could address the above
objections to adversarial adjudication of EITC cases.2 68
Inquisitorial process is used here in its loosest sense, to denote an
adjudicator-driven mode of decisionmaking in which the adjudicator,
rather than the parties, bears responsibility for driving discussion,
framing issues, and soliciting evidence. 269 Two aspects of the
266. This Article's suggestion that EITC compliance should make use of such
inquisitorial processes builds upon the line of current scholarship, most prominently the
work of Bryan Camp, arguing for greater use of collaborative and inquisitorial process in
tax administration. See generally Camp, supra note 174 (arguing that the procedural rules
for litigation in Tax Court should provide an inquisitorial process similar to that found in
tax determination and collection); Camp, supra note 161 (providing empirical evidence
that the adversary process is ineffective at preventing government abuse of the tax
collection process and arguing for reform through implementation of inquisitorial
methods); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431 (2008)
(arguing for more focus on cooperation, as opposed to penalizing and enforcing, in tax
administration).
267. A full-fledged, top-to-bottom analysis of an adjudicative scheme would require far
more attention than could be provided in the course of a single article, let alone a single
Section. For an example of one such analysis, see generally MASHAW, supra note 78
(providing comprehensive analysis of the Social Security Disability Insurance adjudicative
apparatus). In particular, the question of which institutional actor would be responsible for
the administration of such adjudications is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is
worth noting in passing both that such adjudications could be carried out by the U.S. Tax
Court using specialized procedures, and that the National Taxpayer Advocate may possess
the institutional competence to spearhead such a move toward collaborative ex post
adjudication. See, e.g., Camp, supra note 161, at 125-26 (discussing the potential for the
National Taxpayer Advocate to conduct inquisitorial adjudication of Collection Due
Process Claims that are currently heard using adversarial adjudication in Tax Court).
268. In making this proposal, this Article recognizes that the adversarial adjudications
that take place in Tax Court are usually preceded by audits that may well be termed
"inquisitorial." However, the mere availability of such non-adversarial audits-which tend
to take place via correspondence-at some point in the adjudicative process does not
mitigate the concerns this Article raises about adversarial Tax Court adjudication. Insofar
as such audits are generally automated, take place via mail, and involve no face-to-face
interaction between a taxpayer and the IRS, they can hardly be termed "collaborative" in
any meaningful sense. There is also reason to believe that these audits are conducted in a
manner that disadvantages EITC claimants. Forty-three percent of claimants who are
deemed ineligible for a credit following the audit are subsequently granted some or all of
their claimed credit upon making a request for reconsideration. 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE SERV., supranote 101, at i. Further, as Stephen Holt has noted, there are high
non-response rates when EITC claimants are subjected to such audits: "Challenging
circumstances specific to the working poor can make an effective response problematic
because they complicate both receipt and comprehension of correspondence and
documentation of eligibility." Holt, supra note 100, at 191.
269. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in
American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1018 (1974) ("The chief
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system

in particular

appear

well-suited

for the

adjudication of EITC compliance. The first is the inquisitorial
adjudicator's role as an advocate for one or both of the parties.
Unlike adjudicators in adversarial settings, who are expected to serve
as impartial observers, adjudicators in inquisitorial systems perform
three roles: (1) they serve as advocates for the government, critically
scrutinizing

the validity

of the position of the claimant

or

defendant;270 (2) they serve as advocates for claimants or defendants
who do not have professional representation;27 and (3) they serve as
adjudicators who must render a decision. Jerry Mashaw summarizes
the centrality of such adjudicator-driven case development in his
description of Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI")
adjudication:
The primary goal that emerges from the [Social Security
adjudication manual's] developmental guidelines is the
protection of the claimant's interest in full development and

consideration of his or her claim. Although there is a technical
sense in which the claimant has the burden of proof, that is, of
producing evidence that will establish a disability, it seems clear
from the manual that this burden is very modest, indeed. If the

claimant or some other source provides sufficient information
to give direction to a search for relevant evidence, the disability
examiner is expected to follow up every reasonably pertinent
lead.272

Such an active role for the adjudicator in identifying and
obtaining relevant evidence could help compensate for the limited
characteristic of inquisitorial procedure is that it is proactive: it imposes an affirmative
obligation upon state officials to insure that state policies, both substantive and
procedural, are carried out.").
270. See Fred Davis & James Reynolds, Profile of a Social Security Disability Case, 42
Mo. L. REV. 541, 550 (1977) (describing role of inquisitorial adjudicator in Social Security
disability cases).
271. Id. (citing Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187, 1189 (8th Cir. 1974) ("[O]ur
recent decisions have made it clear that the [Administrative Law Judge] has a duty to
fairly and fully develop the matters at issue ....The administrative law judge in social
security cases is in the peculiar position of acting as an adjudicator while also being
charged with developing the facts ....This is especially true when the claimants appear
without counsel.")).
272. MASHAW, supra note 78, at 128; see also Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka:
The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative
Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289, 1325 (1997) ("In the non-adversarial or
'inquisitorial' [Social Security] administrative model, the [Administrative Law Judge] is
charged with the duty of protecting the claimant's rights, developing the facts on the
claimant's behalf, and identifying the issues, regardless of whether the claimant is
represented.").
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resources and expertise of EITC claimants. In Tax Court, EITC
claimants face a significant burden in anticipating the types of
evidence required to satisfy their burden of proof, as well as in
gathering that evidence prior to a formal, one-off adversarial hearing.
An active adjudicator can lighten this burden by informing the
taxpayer of the specific types of evidence that could establish
eligibility in a given case and providing the taxpayer with an
opportunity to gather such evidence and submit it after a hearing'
that is, by "giv[ing] direction to a search for relevant evidence."273
Such an active adjudicator helps avoid the normative concerns that
arise when (as in the status quo) the burden of proof is placed upon a
low-income worker who is pitted against an expert government
bureaucracy in an adversarial tribunal.
The second feature of inquisitorial adjudication that could render
it a superior adjudicative mode for EITC cases is its informality.
Professor Mashaw explains that adjudication of eligibility for
unemployment insurance and other "mass justice" programs
emphasizes "active-adjudicator investigation, informal rules of
evidence and procedure, and presiding officer control of issue
' For example, SSDI hearings
definition and development."274
tend to be quite informal, compared with judicial trials.
Hearings are generally held in the vicinity of the claimant's
home, often in a small conference room in the ALJ's
[Administrative Law Judge] office or in an available state or
federal building. In most hearings, the only persons present are
the ALJ, the stenographer (unless a tape recorder is used), the
claimant, the claimant's representative, and the claimant's
witnesses (such as a relative, former coworker, friend, or family
physician). Hearings are usually very short, averaging half a day
in length. Once the participants are gathered, the ALJ makes a
short explanatory statement and receives into evidence the
pertinent parts of the file, such as medical and hospital reports.
The claimant and his witnesses are then permitted to make
statements. Each claimant is sworn in and questioned by the
ALJ (and the claimant's representative, if any). The ALJ may
then call an independent vocational expert or medical advisor
to review the record and help "interpret" it .... 275

273. MASHAW, supranote 78, at 128.
274. Jerry L. Mashaw, Unemployment Compensation: Continuity, Change, and the
Prospectsfor Reform, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 16 (1996).
275. RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER & JACK M. BEERMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 598 (5th ed. 2006).
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Such informality seems straightforwardly desirable for the first faceto-face encounter between an applicant and the bureaucracy that
adjudges her claim, especially in the EITC context, where the hearing
is generally preceded by the burden of self-certification, as well as a
cumbersome correspondence audit. Moreover, an informal setting
stands to provide a more hospitable forum for claimants who face the
unique challenges of many EITC-eligible workers. As discussed
above, low-income workers may have little experience presenting
themselves in formal settings and further may have a deep-seated fear
of the government, 76 resulting in intimidation and communication
difficulties in the Tax Court context.
In addition to altering the context in which testimony is given, a
more informal setting might also alter the dynamic in which testimony
is received. The nature of courtroom testimony in an adversarial
setting may reflexively stoke an observer's skepticism, a notion
seemingly supported by the cursory rejection of testimony supporting
the claimant in Diaz and Baker.2 77 A more informal dialogue might
help mitigate such skepticism. In upholding the constitutional validity
of the SSDI program's inquisitorial processes, the Supreme Court
stated that the program's emphasis on informal adjudication was "as
it should be, for this administrative procedure, and these hearings,
should be understandable to the layman claimant, should not
necessarily be stiff and comfortable only for the trained attorney, and
'
The
should be liberal and not strict in tone and operation."278
desirability of such informality is arguably even greater in the EITC
context, which definitionally features a low-income litigant base.
In addition to improving the fairness and accuracy of EITC
adjudications, a move to inquisitorial adjudication should yield gains
in efficiency as well. A major reason why inquisitorial adjudication is
often preferred to adversarial adjudication in the context of "mass
276. See Book, supra note 24, at 401-02 ("Another factor that contributes to a lack of
response to IRS correspondence is a general fear of government, especially among
immigrants.").
277. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing Tax Court cases in which judges discounted
taxpayer testimony as lacking in credibility); cf. Bezdek, supra note 244, at 585 ("A short
stay in Baltimore's [adversarial] rent court shows that the 'powerless' speech style
predominates in tenants' usage when speaking with the judge. It coincides in aggregate
with tenants' low success rate in Maryland's most-used court.... [R]esearchers' reports
concerning hearers' assessments of the speech signals of those who feel powerlessness
mirror phenomena observed repeatedly in this local setting. Virtually all tenants who
attempt to claim the protection of the law find, in those moments before the judge, that
tenants are neither credited with accurate or trustworthy reporting, nor are they helped in
scaling the hurdles of filing claimings .... ").
278. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971).
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justice" programs is that such informal adjudication is decidedly less
resource-intensive than adversarial adjudication. 7 9 In the EITC
context, where "easy cases" constitute the bulk of cases for which ex
post eligibility determinations must be made, the SSDI model's
informality could potentially be more efficient than the current
regime."' Simple cases of ineligibility, such as those involving a
married taxpayer who does not file a joint tax return, could be
dispatched promptly, avoiding the procedural formality required
under Tax Court procedures, as well as the seemingly unnecessary
use of IRS prosecutorial resources.
Many deem the inquisitorial process to be contrary to
fundamental principles of the American justice system. But
inquisitorial process has regularly been used in the United States as
the basis for adjudication of certain administrative disputes, 281 and in
particular for adjudication of social benefit eligibility.28 Moreover,
recent scholarship suggests that the general rejection of inquisitorial
modes of adjudication as "un-American" lacks a solid theoretical
foundation,2 83 overlooks the historical role of inquisitorial processes

279. See Dubin, supra note 272, at 1303; see also Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 309 (1985) ("As might be expected in a system which processes
such a large number of claims each year, the process prescribed by Congress for obtaining
disability benefits does not contemplate the adversary mode of dispute resolution utilized
by courts in this country.").
280. Most Tax Court cases involving EITC claims address other tax issues as well, such
as the taxpayer's eligibility for head of household status or a dependency exemption.
There is no reason, however, why those issues could not generally be heard along with the
EITC claims in an inquisitorial hearing, since there is often significant overlap between the
factual and legal underpinnings of a taxpayer's EITC and non-EITC claims. See, e.g.,
Rasco v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2031, 2033-34 (1999) (finding for the taxpayer on
dependency exemption, head of household status, and EITC based upon factual findings
that claimed children lived with petitioner throughout the duration of the tax year in
question).
281. For example, immigration court employs an inquisitorial process, where
immigration judges (IJs) serve simultaneously as adjudicators, prosecutors, and advocates
for the immigrant. See, e.g., Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir.
2007) ("Congress has specifically authorized immigration judges to operate in the dual
role of decisionmaker and prosecutor ....The IJ has broad discretion to control the
manner of interrogation in order to ascertain the truth, ... but that discretion is bounded
by the applicant's right to receive a fair hearing." (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
282. See, e.g., Walters, 473 U.S. at 309-10 (describing use of an inquisitorial process in
veteran disability claim hearings). See generally MASHAW, supra note 78 (providing a
comprehensive account of the use of inquisitorial adjudication in Social Security Disability
Insurance hearings).
283. See generally David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism,122 HARV. L. REV. 1634
(2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court's repeated invocation of the inquisitorial system
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in American law, 28" and fails to account for the increasing use of
inquisitorial process in American civil litigation. 2 5 Moreover, the
most common justifications for adversarial process-that it provides
an effective means of discovering the truth and that it helps safeguard
legal rights 2 86 -are arguably inapplicable when, as in typical EITC
Tax Court cases, a disadvantaged party lacks representation. Absent
counsel, adversarial proceedings that pit the State against a citizen
begin to take on a decidedly troubling cast.287
In summary, the preceding analysis supports this Article's
premise that the usual procedures of tax administration are often a
poor fit for implementing the EITC's antipoverty objectives. Tax
administration is focused primarily on revenue collection from
middle- and upper-income individuals, as well as corporations, and its
processes are thus poorly adapted to the task of distributing payments
to low-income individuals. The use of adversarial Tax Court
procedure to adjudicate EITC compliance provides a straightforward
illustration of this tendency, since requiring unrepresented lowincome litigants to bear the burden of proof in an adversarial setting
not only raises significant concerns about fairness, but also seems
unlikely to provide accurate assessments of eligibility for the EITC.
By looking to nontax programs that pursue policy objectives similar
to the EITC, it is possible to identify a superior administrative
practice: collaborative inquisitorial hearings that are characterized by

as a contrast-model in recent criminal procedure cases does not rest on any consistent
account of what renders a given adjudicative system "inquisitorial").
284. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181,
1198-1210 (2005).
285. See id. at 1190-92 (describing turn toward inquisitorial process in civil litigation
through phenomena such as Alternative Dispute Resolution).
286. See generally David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD
LAWYER 83 (David Luban ed., 1983) (cataloging and critiquing justifications for the
adversarial system).
287. As one commentator wrote in describing the small-case Tax Court procedure
employed in most EITC cases, "litigation ... resembles a small claims court case in which
a business is collecting a debt from an unrepresented consumer." Whitford, supra note
201, at 798-99. Professor Leslie Book has suggested addressing this imbalance by investing
in greater access to counsel for EITC claimants, specifically arguing for expansion of lowincome tax clinics. See Book, supra note 24, at 411-20. Such a measure certainly would be
ameliorative, but would require significant resources and thus may be less politically
feasible than the modification of Tax Court procedure that this Article argues for. Thus,
while regarding Book's proposal as preferable to the status quo, this Article proposes a
more politically feasible procedural reform that addresses the fairness, accuracy, and
efficiency concerns that plague the current approach.
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their informality and by the role of the adjudicator in helping
unrepresented parties develop their case.
While adversarial Tax Court adjudication of EITC
noncompliance affects a relatively small proportion of EITC
claimants, it nonetheless provides a valuable case study
demonstrating the difficulties that ensue when traditional tax
procedures are uncritically applied without regard to the EITC's
antipoverty context. As the next Part of this Article argues, there is
no reason to believe that what is true of this one practice is not true of
EITC administration more generally, or of the administration of
other tax expenditures.
IV. OTHER APPLICATIONS

This Part builds on the analytical method of Part III-a method
under which features of tax administration are subjected to critical
scrutiny to evaluate their appropriateness for a given tax
expenditure's policy objectives-by tentatively exploring other areas
in which administrative hybridity stands to significantly improve the
operation of tax expenditures. To that end, it first explores two
aspects of EITC administration beyond adversarial Tax Court
adjudication where administrative hybridity may improve program
outcomes. It then argues that hybrid administrative practices can be
applied to improve other tax expenditures besides the EITC, and
illustrates this proposition by exploring recent controversies
regarding the alternative fuel mixture credit. 88
This Part's discussion of individual administrative practices is
necessarily tentative. As the discussion in Part III suggests, each of
the administrative practices discussed below is susceptible to
extensive scholarly treatment-and such treatment is desirable if the
EITC and other tax expenditures are to be administered in a logical
manner that reflects their underlying objectives. The analysis below is
offered not to advance and defend specific policy proposals, but
rather to illustrate the lines of inquiry that are made possible by
openness to hybridity in tax administration.
A.

Hybridity in the EITC

In evaluating potential administrative reforms to the EITC, it is
critical to appreciate the program's tremendous complexity and how
reforms to one aspect of the program's administration could
288. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 340-65.
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potentially have implications far beyond their immediate sphere. For

instance, the reform of EITC adjudication proposed in Part III could
potentially have ramifications far beyond ex post compliance

assessment. Policymakers writing eligibility criteria for tax benefits do
so with acute awareness that the criteria will be applied via a tax

system that requires arms-length rules capable of neatly sorting tens
of millions of tax returns each year.289 It is thus possible that a move
toward inquisitorial adjudication of EITC controversies could enable
those drafting the EITC's eligibility criteria to employ a more
standards-based conception of a "qualifying child, ' 29 avoiding the
confusion that arises from the rigid bright-line definition currently
employed.291 Thus, in considering the implications of administrative
hybridity in the three brief vignettes that follow, it is important to

recognize that seemingly unrelated administrative reforms-such as a
shift from adversarial to collaborative adjudication-can have
implications far beyond their immediate operation.
1. EITC Intake Centers
Consistent with its status as a tax program, the EITC currently

has no physical footprint in the form of offices or personnel in the
field. This trait starkly contrasts with traditional welfare's reliance on

field offices, which assist individuals in applying for benefits, render
judgments on eligibility, and address other issues, such as wrongful

termination of benefits.' 92
The lack of such a physical footprint has a variety of implications
for the EITC's administration. The absence of field offices constitutes
a policy choice to shift a variety of costs from the government to
289. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65, 75 (1983) (discussing how tax laws tend to employ bright-line rules in recognition
of the administrative practicalities confronting IRS enforcement staff).
290. The SSDI adjudicative apparatus, which exists almost solely to adjudicate the
question of whether a given impairment is sufficiently severe "to prevent an individual
from doing any gainful activity," see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525 (2011), demonstrates that a
standards-based approach to welfare administration is possible, if not unproblematic. See
generally MASHAW, supra note 78 (providing extensive discussion of the Social Security
Disability adjudicative process).
291. See, e.g., Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 65, at 150 (discussing the uneasy
interplay between the EITC's myriad bright-line rules and the complex family lives and
living arrangements of many EITC recipients). See generally Brian D. Galle, The Role of
Charity in a Federal System (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper,
Working Paper No. 394, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473107 (arguing for
use of notice and comment rulemaking to administer standards-based approach to
eligibility for charitable status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
292. See Super, supra note 72, at 433-34 (2008) (contrasting EITC administrative
infrastructure with that of nontax benefit programs).
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individuals seeking the credit.2 93 David Super explains that in the
absence of field offices, "claimants bear [the costs of] record keeping
and at least part of the costs of learning a program's rules and
completing its application."2' 94 A variety of the issues discussed in
Part I-such as inaccuracy and reliance on predatory paid
preparers-may ultimately be linked, directly or indirectly, to the
absence of a physical presence for administration of the EITC. 95
Thus, the use of intake centers for the EITC could substantially
alter the face of the program and help address many existing
problems. Needless to say, such a proposal may have uncomfortable
implications for those who value the EITC's decentralized reliance on
self-certification. 6 However, if such an effort were undertaken with
attention to the EITC's programmatic goals, it would not necessarily
undermine self-certification. Such offices could serve as optional,
rather than mandatory, means for interested taxpayers to receive
assistance in composing a tax return that accurately reflects their
income and family circumstances. If marketed appropriately and
geared to provide a quick and easy eligibility assessment of the sort
currently provided by private tax preparers, they could well reduce
the burden that self-certification imposes upon EITC claimants and
also reduce the incidence of inadvertent noncompliance. Unlike the
private tax preparers that they would presumably displace, such
offices would have proper incentives to provide accurate as well as
easy eligibility assessments. A focus on customer service rather than
eligibility determination-an "EITC Customer Service Center" open
annually from January to April-could minimize stigma and avoid
the politically problematic connotations of welfare offices. Further, if
such offices reduce the incidence of noncompliance or the quantity of
the EITC benefit currently diverted to private preparers, such intake
centers may not require significant increases in administrative costs,
and could conceivably yield savings.
2. Recoupment
When an assessment is entered against a taxpayer for
underpayment of taxes, the IRS's power to collect is "an awesome
one." 297 Though certain notice and hearing requirements apply,298 the

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See id. at 433.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-83.
See supra text accompanying notes 147-56.
See SALTZMAN, supra note 174, 14.01.
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IRS is flexibly empowered to employ levies and liens to seize
taxpayer property.2 9 Once an assessment is entered against a
taxpayer, the IRS has "the equivalent of [a] judgment obtained by a
general creditor."3 ' In Bull v. United States," 1 the Supreme Court
upheld the IRS's expansive collection power by stating that "taxes are
the life-blood of government, and their prompt and certain
availability an imperious need. ' '3 °2
Assessments against low-income taxpayers deemed to have
erroneously claimed the EITC can be as high as several thousand
dollars.30 3 For a low-income taxpayer, such sudden and substantial
financial liability can have drastic consequences. Consider again, for
example, the case of Daniel Aaron Baker, who in 2006 was found
liable to the IRS for $3,556.11 Baker's total income in 2003 was
$15,349, a portion of which was devoted to childcare expenses for
Baker's daughter, who was four years old.3" 5 Assuming that three
years later, when the assessment against Baker was entered, his
income had not significantly increased, he had not saved a significant
amount of the credit, and his child care expenses had not diminished,
the entry of a $3,556 assessment against him likely had significant
financial consequences. While the IRS has statutory authority to
negotiate repayment by installments, 316 make offers-in-compromise,3 7
and designate certain assessments as not collectible,30 8 it can still be
expected that there will be many circumstances in which such
assessments will impose substantial financial hardships upon lowincome workers. For example, the IRS might place a lien upon real
property owned by the EITC claimant. The harsh effects that such
substantial assessments have on individual taxpayers are difficult to
justify in cases such as Baker's, where the taxpayer's erroneous EITC
claim appears at most to be a product of inadvertence or poor record
298. See I.R.C. § 6320 (2006) (detailing collection due process rights where the IRS has
filed a notice of a lien); I.R.C. § 6330 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (detailing collection due
process rights where the IRS has filed notice of a levy).
299. See SALTZMAN, supra note 174, 14.01.
300. id.
301. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
302. Id. at 259.
303. See, e.g., Baker v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 949, 949 (2006) (entering assessment
of $3,556); Diaz v. Comn'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1420, 1420 (2004) (entering assessment of
$5,179).
304. See Baker, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 949, 952-53.
305. Id. at 950.
306. I.R.C. § 6159 (2006).
307. See § 7122.
308. I.R.C. § 6404(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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keeping, rather than deliberate fraud. Such consequences are
especially troubling in light of the high error rate associated with
EITC audits.3 9
In social security administration, when an individual erroneously
receives overpayments, the means by which the government can
recoup its overpayments are narrowly circumscribed by statute to a
modest range of procedures, including decreases in future social
security payments or reduction in future tax refunds.310 Moreover, the
government's latitude to reduce such future payments is limited by
the command that "there shall be no adjustment of payments to, or
recovery by the United States from, any person who is without fault if
such adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of this
subchapter or would be against equity and good conscience." 31' Social
Security Administration regulations define this provision as
prohibiting the government from "depriv[ing] a person of income
required for ordinary and necessary living expenses ' ' 312 when the
overpayment
person "neither knew nor should have known that the 313
incorrect.
was
based
was
it
which
on
information
the
or
A similar procedure in the EITC context could be structured in a
number of ways. Reductions in future EITC payments could be
preferenced over liens and levies as a means of recouping
overpayments. Alternatively, the government's lien and levy power
could be left intact with the caveat that it not be exercised in such a
manner as to "deprive a person of income required for ordinary and
necessary living expenses. 314 Importing social security-style
recoupment procedures into the EITC context would provide a
paradigmatic illustration of how administrative hybridity stands to
improve the EITC by ensuring that the program's administration is
sensitive to the unique circumstances of its low-income participants.

309. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: PREFACE & HIGHLIGHTS 11 (2009), availableat http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-utl/09_tasarc exec_summary.pdf (noting that 43% of EITC claimants who
request reconsideration of an unfavorable audit are subsequently deemed eligible for the
credit, receiving, on average, 96% of the amount claimed).
310. See 42 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
311. § 404(b).
312. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.508 (2011).
313. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 685 (1979) (summarizing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.507).
314. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.508.
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B. Hybridity in Other Tax Expenditures
The shortcomings of tax administration are particularly
pronounced in the EITC context, given the stark mismatch between
the core competencies of tax administration and the EITC's
antipoverty mission. However, administrative experimentation can
potentially improve not only the EITC, but a host of other tax
expenditures as well. The Joint Committee on Taxation's most recent
estimates of federal tax expenditures identified as many as 240
provisions in the tax code susceptible to characterization as tax
expenditures.315 These tax expenditure provisions pertain to a wide
variety of policy areas with little or no relation to the tax system's
traditional function of revenue collection: fields ranging from
education (the Lifetime Learning Credit for college tuition),316 to
agriculture (the deduction for soil and water conservation
expenditures),317 to energy (the credit for energy efficiency
improvements to existing homes).318 While there will certainly be
circumstances in which specific policy goals in such fields are wellserved by the tax system's administrative strengths, so too will there
be circumstances in which policy goals will be better advanced by the
active administration typically associated with traditional
administrative agencies. There is a reason, after all, why there are
cabinet departments dedicated to subjects such as education,
agriculture, and transportation. It is precisely when a tax
expenditure's policy goals might require more or different
administration than the tax system is capable of providing that
policymakers should consider applying hybrid administrative
practices.
To appreciate the need for hybrid administration in tax
expenditures other than the EITC, it is helpful to identify the core
features of tax administration that make it well-suited for achieving
some policy goals and poorly suited for achieving others. Two related
features of tax administration merit particular attention: first, tax
administration is generally passive as compared to more conventional
bureaucracies;

second,

it is

generally

nondiscretionary.19 Tax

315. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., supra note 14, at 34-51.
316. I.R.C. § 25A(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
317. I.R.C. § 126 (2006).
318. I.R.C. § 25C(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
319. These labels are necessarily simplifications, as any attempt to characterize tax
administration in so limited a space must necessarily be. For example, while tax
administration in large part passively relies on taxpayers and third parties to provide
required information, the IRS does have an active enforcement function that it carries out
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administration is passive in the sense that the tax system relies
primarily on voluntary taxpayer compliance, in which the "active"
task of collecting income information and determining a given
taxpayer's tax liability is performed almost entirely by private parties
who submit tax returns and other information to the IRS. While the
IRS promulgates regulations interpreting the meaning of certain tax
provisions and conducts audits of a small proportion of returns,320 its
primary role in tax administration is to receive and process millions of
tax returns each year, a passive task made more so by the fact that it
is carried out primarily through automated computer systems.32'
In addition to this passivity, another defining trait of American
tax administration is that, as a general rule, it provides administrators
with very little discretion. The tax system is an intricate and highly
technical system consisting largely of bright-line rules that are
intended to maximize predictability and minimize the exercise of
administrative discretion by street-level bureaucrats.3 22 As Stanley
through the audit process. See 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 167, at
86 (describing the "traditional IRS exam model, which is comprised of post-filing
compliance and audits, in the context of an enforcement agency mission and mentality").
Similarly, although the IRS's administrative mode is, by and large, nondiscretionary,
scholars have noted that there are exceptions to this general rule, which create substantial
opportunities for the IRS to exercise discretion. See Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of
Consistency: The Failureof Common Law Making and a ProposedLegislative Solution, 77
TENN. L. REV. 563, 585-88 (2010) ("The traditional view is that the IRS has minimal
discretion: the Internal Revenue Code sets out definite rules for the determination of tax
liabilities, and the IRS's job is simply to apply those rules. This view is correct in the main,
but there are significant pockets of administrative discretion within the generally nondiscretionary system.").
320. The audit rate for individual taxpayers is less than 1%. See, e.g., INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2006 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS 3 (2006),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/ll-06-enforcement-stats.pdf (reporting
audit rate of 0.98% in 2006); Table 9-Examination Coverage: Recommended and Average
Recommended Additional Tax After Examination, by Type and Size of Return, Fiscal Year
2007, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil07db09revised.xls (last updated Apr. 2009)
(reporting audit rate of 0.9% in 2007).
321. See generally Camp, supra note 160, at 242-67 (discussing IRS's adoption of
computer-based "batch processing" of tax returns). In contrast, there was a time in the
nineteenth century when federal income taxation was typified by "active administration,"
featuring tax assessors and collectors who personally visited the residence of each taxpayer
in their district. See id. at 231.
322. See Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of
the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 697 (1969) ("The chief
advantage of a detailed tax statute is that it provides certainty as to most of the matters
covered by the detail."); see also Diver, supra note 289, at 75 ("The costs of applying rules
often loom especially large in the formulation of standards designed to govern a large
volume of disputes.... [In] administration of the tax laws, which depend on large
decentralized enforcement staffs, the costs of applying rules often push rules to a highly
transparent extreme.").
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Surrey has explained, the tax code is generally interpreted in a literal
manner that deprives IRS administrators of discretion: "[A]nswers
are not ...provided by the administrators of the tax system but by
the Congress. The answers are also provided quickly-here they are,
right in the statute-and do not have to await case by case
323
development.
Passive, nondiscretionary administration has distinct advantages.
A self-assessment system in which the costs of tax compliance are
delegated to private parties is substantially less intrusive and less
expensive for the government than are "government assessment"
systems.32 4 Likewise, literal-minded, nondiscretionary administration
provides transactional predictability that is critical to transactional
security and much valued by tax lawyers and accountants.325
However, the IRS's generally passive and nondiscretionary
administrative practices entail significant limitations as well, and tax
expenditures that are negatively affected by these limitations may
offer prime opportunities for the beneficial use of hybrid
administrative practices. For example, while tax returns and
computers may be useful for collecting and processing information
about financial transactions, the tax system is not necessarily capable
of effectively measuring complex qualitative phenomena.3 26 Consider,
for example, the long-standing tax credit for corporate research and
development, which provides a credit for research that is
undertaken for the purpose of discovering information (i)
which is technological in nature, and (ii) the application of
which is intended to be useful in the development of a new or
improved business component of the taxpayer, and (C)
substantially all of the activities of which constitute elements of
a process of experimentation for a purpose... [related] to (i) a

323. Surrey, supranote 322, at 698.
324. For a comparative perspective on the relative advantages of self-assessment and
government-assessment systems, see Robert P. Strauss & Jin K. Hyun, The Evolution of
the IRS and Taxpayer Compliance: Some Implicationsfor Korea, CARNEGIE-MELLON U.,
29 (Mar. 2, 2001), http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/rs9f/strauss-hyun.pdf.

325. See Surrey, supra note 322, at 697.
326. See 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 167, at 88-89 ("The bestdesigned tax-based social programs are crafted in a way that eligibility to claim the credit
is verifiable with data to which the IRS has access-ideally before the funds are even

released. Considerations include whether the credit requires information already captured
on the income tax return or whether the IRS has direct or indirect access to other data
sources that can serve as a proxy for eligibility. Alternatively, an eligibility determination
might require information outside the current reach of the IRS absent an audit, making it
difficult for the IRS to screen for noncompliance.").
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new or improved function, (ii) performance, or (iii) reliability
or quality.327
It is difficult to even define, let alone capture on a tax return, whether
a given investment qualifies as serving the "purpose of discovering
information ...the application of which is intended to be useful in
the development of a new or improved business component of the
taxpayer."32 Given that such criteria are not easily ascertainable on a
tax return nor otherwise susceptible to nondiscretionary, bright-line
administration, it is unsurprising the IRS had considerable difficulty
interpreting and implementing the research credit. 29 Hybrid
administrative practices borrowed from other administrative
domains-such as a requirement that a firm submit an application
and have a particular expenditure pre-certified for the credit-could
allow for a more administrable, standards-based definition of
qualifying research that would avoid many of the difficulties the IRS
has encountered in implementing the credit.
Another drawback of the passive, nondiscretionary character of
American tax administration is that it renders the IRS largely
incapable of flexibly responding to short-term problems or changes in
circumstances.3 3 ° Accordingly, tax expenditures that address dynamic
problems and thus require engaged administration may be ill-served
by the tax system. For example, the EITC identifies eligible families
using the tax system's built-in mechanism for measuring need: a tax
return that indicates a family's income over a one-year period. But as
Anne Alstott explains, "[b]ecause incomes fluctuate-sometimes
dramatically-as jobs are won and lost, wages and hours worked
change, and marriages form and dissolve, the measurement interval
[for a social welfare program] is important" in assessing a taxpayer's
actual need for assistance.33 ' The tax system has no built-in
mechanism to measure such fluctuations, and thus may often
dramatically over- or underestimate the true need of a given taxpayer

327. I.R.C. § 41(d) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
328. Id.
329. See Alan D. Viard, Tax Policy and Growth, in RULES FOR GROWTH:
PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 204-06 (2011)
(discussing the IRS's difficulty devising administrable interpretations of the research tax
credit).
330. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 20, at 567-68 (explaining that "institutional choices"
in tax administration "make tax-based programs less accurate in tailoring benefits to need,
less responsive to changing needs, and less capable of enforcing compliance than their
traditional [welfare] counterparts").
331. See id. at 579.
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over a given period of time.332 Such limitations with respect to short-

term responsiveness are not only a problem for programs targeted at
needy taxpayers: for corporate tax expenditures, too, the IRS's
limited discretion renders it incapable of responsively addressing
changed circumstances-even ones that produce outcomes decidedly
at odds with a given tax expenditure's policy objectives.3 33 That is, any

tax expenditure that addresses dynamic, rapidly changing policy
environments may encounter difficulties by virtue of the tax system's
sclerotic administrative apparatus. 34
A final drawback of tax administration is that, as has been
repeated throughout this Article, the tax system's passive reliance on
taxpayers to conduct self-assessments of liability leads to significant
complications when tax expenditures target demographics not
traditionally engaged by the income tax system. Such hazards are a
function not only of the tax system's passivity but also of its use of
nondiscretionary, bright-line rules that, because they must govern
possible contingencies, have become so complex that they are not
necessarily accessible to nonpractitioners, let alone undereducated or
non-English-speaking individuals. To the extent that the EITC or
other tax expenditures targeted at low-income taxpayers engage
individuals with little experience filing tax returns, those expenditures
could likely be improved by outreach or preparation assistance
initiatives that have analogues in nontax administrative practices but
are not traditionally provided by the tax system.3 35

In short, a tax expenditure will be well-suited for implementation
through unmodified tax administration if its goals are susceptible to
achievement through passive, nondiscretionary administration in
which automated processes and predefined rules are mechanically
applied with little need for administrative initiative. For example,
332. See generally Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging
Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2003) (providing empirical demonstration that
low-income taxpayers experience greater income fluctuations than higher-income families
and that the tax system's reliance on annual returns therefore fails to accurately measure
their need).
333. See infra text accompanying notes 337-58 (discussing the IRS's failure to
effectively respond to controversial corporate claims for the alternative fuel mixture
credit).
334. Cf. Surrey, supra note 322, at 699 (arguing that the results of the tax code's
reliance on nondiscretionary bright line rules is "very often precision of detail but
obscurity of over-all policy and intent").
335. See 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 167, at 87 ("By clearly
identifying the targeted behaviors and populations, the future administrator of the benefit
program will be better situated to increase the participation rate by effectively planning
outreach and education activities.").
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from a strictly administrative perspective, pure tax administration
may be an appropriate vehicle for an expenditure such as the home
mortgage interest deduction, which in most cases allows taxpayers to
simply deduct all of their mortgage interest.33 6 Interest payments are
precisely the sort of discrete financial transaction that the tax system
is adept at measuring. On the other hand, if a tax expenditure's policy
goals could be advanced by active and discretionary administration, it
follows that pure, unmodified tax administration may not be the most
effective vehicle for its implementation. In such circumstances,
policymakers should consider implementing hybrid administrative
practices that compensate for the limitations of traditional tax
administration. A good rule of thumb may be that when a tax
expenditure seeks to achieve an objective that has historically been
implemented via conventional administrative channels, such as grants
from federal agencies, it is likely that hybrid administrative practices
can be identified from historical administrative practices and
deployed to good effect in the context of tax administration.
Consider, for example, the alternative fuel mixture credit
enacted in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation
Equity Act ("SAFETEA") of 2005.337 SAFETEA provided a
refundable excise tax credit of fifty cents for every gallon of
"alternative fuel mixture" used by certain taxpayers in "producing
any alternative fuel mixture for sale or use in a trade or business of
' The credit's criteria require that the alternative fuel
the taxpayer."338
be mixed with a taxable transportation fuel.339 As originally defined in
SAFETEA, the alternative fuel mixture credit applied only to the use
336. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 936: HOME MORTGAGE
INTEREST DEDUCTION 2 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p936.pdf ("In
most cases, you can deduct all of your home mortgage interest."). Of course, there remain
non-administrative reasons to conclude that the tax system is an inappropriate mechanism
for providing subsidies to homebuyers, most notably the regressivity of benefits that take
the form of tax deductions. See supra text accompanying note 7.

337. Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 11113(b)(2), 119 Stat. 1144, 1946-48 (2005) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 6426(d)-(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
338. See § 11113(b)(2), 119 Stat. at 1947. Technically, the provision may arguably not
be a tax expenditure because it is a credit not against the income tax, but against the
federal motor fuels excise tax provided for by I.R.C. § 4081(a) (West 2011). Cf.Gilbert E.
Metcalf, Using Tax Expenditures To Achieve Energy Policy Goals, AM. ECON. REV., May
2008, at 90, 92 ("The ethanol tax credit is not officially a tax expenditure because it
reduces revenue for the federal motor fuels excise tax rather than the income tax ....).
However, because the credit is refundable, its operation is effectively indistinguishable
from that of a refundable income tax credit. As such, it is analytically indistinguishable
from a tax expenditure for purposes of this discussion.
339. See Internal Revenue Serv., Alternative Fuel and Alternative Fuel Mixtures; Blood
Collector Organizations,I.R.S. Notice 2006-92, 2006-43 I.R.B. 774 (Oct. 23, 2006).
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of "liquid hydrocarbons derived from biomass." 34° In 2007, Congress
amended the provision to eliminate any reference to "liquid
hydrocarbons" and to instead allow the credit to be claimed by users
of any "liquid fuel derived from biomass." 3 1 The Joint Committee on
Taxation would later describe this amendment as having been
enacted "to conform the statute to the legislative intent of the 2005
provision" by allowing fish oil producers to claim the credit.342
Whatever the congressional intent behind it, this amendment had
a significant unanticipated effect. In late 2008, American paper
producers began registering with the IRS as alternative fuel
producers and claiming the alternative fuel mixture credit for their
'
a wood byproduct generated during the
use of "black liquor,"343
papermaking process that paper producers have burned for fuel since
the 1930s. 3" Because the credit required that an alternative fuel be
mixed with a taxable transportation fuel, in order to qualify for the
credit paper producers began to add diesel fuel to the black liquor
they burned during the ordinary course of paper production. 345 The
addition of diesel fuel served no purpose except to qualify the
burning of black liquor for the credit.3 46 Soon, paper companies began
receiving refund checks from the Treasury worth hundreds of millions
of dollars.3 47 When the credit had been enacted in 2005, the Joint
Committee on Taxation had estimated that it would cost the Treasury
$44 million over ten years. In the first six months of 2009 alone, more
than $2.5 billion in cash payments were distributed under the credit,
340. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET

PROPOSAL, PART II: BUSINESS TAX PROVISIONS 81 (Comm. Print 2009), available at

http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3576.
341. See Act of Dec. 29, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-172, § 5(a)(2), 121 Stat. 2473, 2479
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6426(d)(2)(G) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
342. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., supra note 340, at 81-82.
Because fish oil contains oxygen as well as hydrogen and carbon, it arguably did not
qualify as a "liquid hydrocarbon." Id.

343. Steven Mufson, Obama Seeks To Halt Alternative Tax Fuel Credit for Paper
Industry, WASH. POST, May 9,2009, at A18.
344. Christopher Hayes, Pulp Nonfiction, THE NATION, Apr. 20, 2009, at 6, availableat
http://www.thenation.com/article/pulp-nonfiction.

345. Jad Mouawad & Clifford Krauss, Lawmakers May Limit Paper Mills' Windfall,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at B1, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/business
/energy-environment/18sludge.html.
346. One hedge fund analyst pithily explained the waste generated by the process:

"You use the toilet every day. Imagine if you could start pouring a little gasoline into the
bowl and get fifty cents a gallon every time you flushed." Hayes, supra note 344, at 6.
347. Martin A. Sullivan, New $25 Billion Tax Windfall for Paper Companies, TAX.COM
(Oct. 15, 2009), http://tax.com/taxcom/taxblog.nsf/Permalink/MSUN-7WUGPT
?OpenDocument.
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the vast majority of which were claimed by paper manufacturers
burning black liquor.348
Furthermore, the fact that the credit ultimately served primarily
as a subsidy for the U.S. paper industry did not go unnoticed by
foreign paper manufacturers or foreign governments. In May 2009,
the Brazilian, Chilean, Canadian, and European Union ambassadors
to the United States sent a joint letter to Congress calling for the
credit's immediate revocation.34 9 The letter argued that the credit
created "market distortions and imbalances" that risked depressing
the global paper market by causing American manufacturers to
overproduce paper during a period of low paper prices.350 It also
noted that the credit's "windfall cash infusions ... give[] [companies
in the United States who take advantage of the credit] an immediate,
artificial competitive advantage over their foreign and domestic
'
competitors with longer-term impacts to the international market."3 51
The ambassadors' letter ominously suggested that the credit was an
"actionable subsidy and that any adverse effects caused by this tax
credit could be subject to remedies in the [World Trade Organization]
or through domestic countervailing duty investigations. 35 2 Soon after,
commentators began to suggest that the tax credit could become the

348. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., supra note 340, at 82. These
costs were compounded by the cellulosic biofuel producer credit which was added to the
tax code by the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 15321,
122 Stat. 923, 1512 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 40(b)(6) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
That provision provided a $1.01 per gallon income tax credit for production of qualified
cellulosic biofuel. The cellulosic biofuel credit was, unlike the alternative fuel mixture
credit, nonrefundable. However, it also differed from the alternative fuel mixture credit
because it served as an income tax credit, rather than a credit against gasoline excise taxes,
allowing it to be claimed by companies with no excise tax liability.
349. Letter from Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Ambassador of Brazil to the United
States, Michael Wilson, Ambassador of Canada to the United States, Jose Gofui,
Ambassador of Chile to the United States, and John Bruton, Head of the European
Commission Delegation to the United States, to Senator Max Baucus, Representative
Charles Rangel, Senator Charles Grassley, and Representative Dave Camp (May 20,
2009), available at http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/washington/offices-bureaux/media
_room-sallede-presse/black-noir-2.aspx?lang=eng.
350. Id.

351. Id.
352. Id.
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focal point of a major international trade dispute,353 and Canada
enacted a massive counter-subsidy for its domestic paper industry.354
The alternative fuel mixture credit was thus a catastrophic policy
failure on many levels. For one, while the credit may well have
subsidized certain uses of alternative fuel that would not have taken
place in its absence, it ultimately served primarily to transfer billions
of dollars from the U.S. Treasury to domestic paper manufacturers
for their continuing use of a decades-old process. It also may well
have led to a net increase in overall fossil fuel consumption, insofar as
the manufacturers unnecessarily added diesel fuel to black liquor for
' The credit
the sole purpose of creating a qualifying "fuel mixture."355
was also a policy failure with respect to its impact on the public fisc,
as it resulted in payouts to the paper industry that dwarfed the
modest original projections of its anticipated cost. And, what is more,
the credit's unanticipated effects triggered a significant international
trade dispute.
This abject policy failure cannot be fully understood without
reference to the passive, nondiscretionary character of American tax
administration. For example, a June 3, 2009 memo by the IRS Office
of Chief Counsel employed a hyper-literal reading of statutory and
regulatory language and concluded that because black liquor is "an
aqueous solution that has the consistency of molasses at the time it is
introduced into the recovery boiler," the substance is a "liquid fuel
derived from biomass" that satisfies statutory criteria for the
alternative fuel mixture credit.356 This policy-agnostic parsing of
statutory and regulatory language is fairly typical of tax
administration, in which interpretation of the tax code is regarded as
a unique art that is methodologically distinct from other modes of

353. See, e.g., Cyndee Todgham Cherniak, Is Black Liquid the Next Big Trade
Dispute?, TRADE LAW. BLOG (May 21, 2009, 9:55 PM), http://tradelawyersblog.com/blog
/archive/2009/may/article/is-black-iquid-the-next-big-trade-dispute/?tx-ttnews[day]=21 &
cHash=0bf365a2a8.
354. Editorial, The Black Liquor War, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2009, at A12, availableat

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124623488607866601.html (reporting that Canada enacted
an $882 million counter-subsidy for its domestic paper industry in response to payments

made to American paper companies under the alternative fuel mixture credit).
355. Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Policies for Low-Carbon Technologies, 62 NAT'L TAX J.
519, 527 (2009) ("The example from the paper industry is troubling beyond the

inframarginal nature of the subsidy. If the tax credit is raising the demand for diesel fuel in
order to make the biofuel eligible for the credit, then it is having the perverse effect of
raising, rather than lowering, demand for petroleum products.").
356. Memorandum from I.R.S. Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs & Special
Industries) to John Imoff, I.R.S. Director, Specialty Tax, I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem.
200941011, at 5 (June 3, 2009), availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0941011,pdf.
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statutory interpretation, let alone from the promulgation of legislative
regulations by administrative agencies. 35 7 However, the mechanical
application of a complex and inflexible rule structure is a poor
method for administration of programs that must address dynamic,
real-world policy problems.3 5 Such mechanical administration is
precisely how a tax provision intended to provide a modest incentive
for innovative uses of alternative energy could transform into a multibillion dollar subsidy to paper manufacturers, increase overall
consumption of fossil fuels, and precipitate an international trade

war.
Much like the EITC's noncompliance problems, the policy
failure of the alternative fuel mixture credit illustrates the serious
difficulties that can ensue when tax expenditures are left to
administer themselves. A willingness to draw on administrative
practices used by nontax agencies could have potentially averted
these troubling outcomes. Congress, for instance, could have
delegated authority to promulgate regulations governing the credit's

357. See, e.g., REV. PROC. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689 ("At the heart of administration is
interpretation of the Code. It is the responsibility of each person in the Service, charged
with the duty of interpreting the law, to try to find the true meaning of the statutory
provision and not to adopt a strained construction in the belief that he is 'protecting the
revenue.' The revenue is properly protected only when we ascertain and apply the true
meaning of the statute."); David P. Hariton, Tax Benefits, Tax Administration, and
Legislative Intent, 53 TAX LAW. 579, 613-14 (2000) ("It troubles me ... that so much of
the analysis of tax-motivated transactions seems narrow and technically focused.
Practitioners provide their clients with long opinions full of detailed considerations of
whether this, or that, provision will or will not apply, and the Service goes through similar
considerations in deciding whether a given transaction is vulnerable to attack. Yet the
whole dialogue seems beside the point, like arguing about protocol on a sinking ship....
[W]e should not try to deny that judgment colors the technical analysis. Rather, we should
try to make that judgment as deep and reflective as possible, taking full account of the
reasons why the relevant statutes were enacted to begin with."); Lawrence Zelenak, The
Court and the Code: A Response to the Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation, 58
DUKE L.J. 1783, 1783 (2009) ("Most tax lawyers (myself included) believe there are
features of the Internal Revenue Code that distinguish the art of interpreting the code
from the interpretation of most other statutes.").
358. Cf Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1704-05 (1976) ("The difficulty of arriving at a consensus about the optimal
social role of rules is best illustrated by the case of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which governs commercial contracts. According to a persistent line of theorizing
associated with Max Weber, this should be an area prototypically adapted to rules. The
'social function of maintaining the market' supposedly requires a formal approach here, if
anywhere. Yet the drafters of Article 2 proceeded on the conviction that general
commercial law was prototypically adapted to standards. This choice was explicitly based
on the claim that ideas like 'reasonableness' and 'good faith' provide greater predictability
in practice than the intricate and technical rule system they have replaced." (footnotes
omitted)).
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availability to the Department of Energy or it could have avoided
subsidizing pre-existing inframarginal activities by requiring all
entities claiming the credit to submit plans to the Department of
Energy demonstrating innovative uses of alternative fuel
technologies. The Department of Energy has significant expertise in
implementing programs and devising regulations intended to advance
real-world energy policies, and one would expect that its analysis of
whether a given fuel qualified for billions of dollars of federal energy
subsidies would extend beyond the mere fact that the fuel was an
"aqueous solution that has the consistency of molasses. 3 59 That is to
say, as an administrative agency with extensive subject matter
expertise, the department can be expected to be more effective in
anticipating and avoiding undesirable policy outcomes than the IRS
Office of Chief Counsel. Although such active administration may be
costly to implement, to the extent that it will prevent wasteful
expenditures such as the black liquor controversy, it may ultimately
prove to be the more efficient approach.
Such proposals may sound farfetched to those accustomed to
American tax administration. But a comparative perspective suggests
that they are eminently plausible. Consider the contrast between the
American and Canadian administration of tax expenditures
promoting soil and watershed conservation. The Internal Revenue
Code contains a host of tax provisions that seek to promote such
conservation, which, like all American tax expenditures, are passively
administered by the IRS using nondiscretionary criteria. 3" These
provisions have had mixed results in actually promoting conservation,
in part because of the limitations of the tax code's bright-line rules.361
Canada, too, provides a tax incentive designed to promote such
conservation, in the form of a nonrefundable tax credit for donors of
ecologically-sensitive land.362 But as Professor Kim Brooks explains,
the Canadian tax credit is administered not by the Canadian Revenue
Agency, but "by Environment Canada [the Canadian federal
environmental department], which, among other things, has to
359. See Memorandum from IRS Associate Chief Counsel, supra note 356, at 2.
360. See I.R.C. § 126 (2006) (providing taxpayers with exclusion for certain payments
related to soil and water conservation); I.R.C. § 175 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (providing
farmers with deduction for expenses for the purpose of soil or water conservation, or for
erosion prevention); § 170(h) (allowing charitable deduction for donation of conservation
easements).
361. See Janet E. Milne, Watersheds: Runoff from the Tax Code, 34 VT. L. REV. 883,
887-89 (2010).
362. Kim Brooks, A Comment on Watersheds: Runoff from the Tax Code, 34 VT. L.
REV. 895,901 (2010).
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'
precertify the gift, including the appraisal value."363
As Professor
Brooks comments, because such environmental provisions "have
nothing to do with the technical tax system, it would seem to make
sense for the tax subsidy for donations of ecologically sensitive land
to be administered by an environmentally sensitive government body,
and for pre-donation reviews to be conducted.""36 The Canadian
conservation regime provides a consummate illustration of hybrid tax
administration at work, and makes clear that the fact that an
expenditure is administered through the tax code does not compel
that it be administered using unmodified tax procedure.
Just as Canada requires its environmental agency to precertify
applications for its conservation tax credit, there is no reason why the
U.S. Department of Energy could not have been tasked with preapproving applications for the alternative fuel mixture credit. While
such a requirement would have entailed administrative expenses, it
could also have potentially prevented a multi-billion dollar payout
from the federal treasury, as well as an international trade dispute.
Hybrid approaches may be alien to American tax administration, but
they provide viable administrative tools, and their potential policy
benefits are too significant to be ignored.

CONCLUSION

This Article advances a simple thesis that few would deny, but
that tax expenditure analysis has neglected for far too long:
administration matters. Whether a tax expenditure aims to fight
poverty, promote use of alternative energies, or achieve any of the
myriad other public policy objectives that Congress has embedded in
the tax code, the examples of the EITC and the alternative fuel
mixture credit suggest that a reliance on unmodified tax
administration will often cause unanticipated results at odds with the
tax expenditure's policy objectives.
Tax expenditure scholars have long recognized, and indeed
emphasized, that tax administration is ill-equipped to promote policy
objectives besides revenue collection. But rather than focus on the
possibility that the administration of tax expenditures might be
reformed, scholars have instead focused on eliminating tax
expenditures or recasting them as direct spending programs. This may
be the ideal solution to the deficiencies of tax expenditures that go far
beyond the administrative difficulties emphasized in this Article. But
363. Id.
364. Id. at 902.
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tax expenditures have shown remarkable staying power, and it
follows that tax expenditure scholars should balance their emphasis
on the elimination of tax expenditures with exploration of
opportunities to mitigate tax expenditures' various shortcomings.
Recent scholarship urging that tax expenditures should be
crafted as refundable tax credits and not take into account a
claimant's marginal tax rate represents one such strand of scholarship
focused on mitigating tax expenditures' shortcomings, rather than
eliminating them outright."36 This Article hopes to initiate another, by
arguing that a tax expenditure need not necessarily be administered
using pure tax procedure, but rather that tax expenditures'
administration can be customized using practices developed and
perfected in nontax programs. The EITC provides a particularly
compelling case study for the promise of such hybrid administrative
procedures, since tax administration is not at all well-suited for
promoting the program's antipoverty mission and has been the source
of profound and well-documented problems in the program. EITC
proponents therefore need not uncritically accept the program's use
of unmodified tax administration, but rather should seek out
opportunities to implement hybrid administrative practices that
reflect the EITC's antipoverty mission and low-income clientele.
The same holds true for tax expenditures more generally, as the
examples of the Alternative Fuel Mixture and Soil Conservation
Credits illustrate. The tax code is replete with expenditures that seek
to promote policy goals not traditionally associated with the tax
system's administrative focus on revenue collection via mass
processing of tax returns. Such expenditures are enduring policy tools
that have withstood decades of calls for their elimination. Neither
scholars nor policymakers can continue to ignore their
administration.

365. See BATCHELDER & TODER, supra note 15, at 11-15 (arguing that structuring tax
expenditures as refundable tax credits and ensuring that they operate without regard to a
claimant's marginal tax rate can address the problematic tendency of tax expenditures to
provide the greatest benefit to the most well-off taxpayers).

